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U.S. courts have relied on the presumption against
extraterritoriality to limit the application of federal law beyond U.S.
borders for more than two centuries. While courts have fairly
consistently concluded that federal statutes lacking any express
territorial limitations should not be construed to apply worldwide,
the doctrinal tests and justifications for the presumption against
extraterritoriality have varied significantly over time. U.S. courts
have variously interpreted federal law to apply only within U.S.
borders, to conduct abroad that produced effects in U.S. territory,
where reasonable pursuant to a balancing test, and—most recently,
under Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.—where the “focus” of
the statute at issue was in the United States. In some cases, the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied to override
the most plausible reading of statutory language.
This Article considers whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality is consistent with modern textualism. Textualism
instructs courts to focus primarily on implementing statutory text,
read in context. As a consequence, textualists reject substantive
canons of statutory interpretation that displace the best reading of
the statutory text unless a canon is so ingrained that it forms part of
the legal background against which Congress legislates. This Article
concludes that none of the various doctrinal variations of the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been invoked
consistently enough to qualify as such a background convention.
Proponents of textualism should therefore no longer apply the
* Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. The views expressed in this Article are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the author’s firm or any of its
clients.
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presumption to supplant the most plausible interpretation of a
statute. Nonetheless, courts’ consistent reliance on different
iterations of the presumption to limit statutes that are phrased
universally (referring, for example, to “any seaman,” or “every
contract”) and that contain no express territorial limitations gives
rise to a narrower canon that conforms with textualist tenets: Courts
may interpret such universally worded statutes to have some limits
consistently with textualism. This Article further contends that
textualism should be understood to require a consistent standard for
addressing the extraterritorial applicability of universally worded or
ambiguous statutes in order to further objectives of consistency and
predictability. The Article suggests that an international law
presumption is the most plausible approach and is preferable to the
analysis set forth in Morrison. Finally, the Article concludes more
broadly that textualists should consider adopting substantive
canons to resolve ambiguity in other statutes that present recurring
issues of statutory interpretation, just as statutes that are ambiguous
as to their geographic scope present a recurring interpretive issue.
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INTRODUCTION
The presumption against extraterritoriality has evolved
substantially since its inception in the early nineteenth century.
While U.S. courts have fairly uniformly concluded that, absent
statutory text to the contrary, federal statutes should be construed
as containing some territorial limits, the doctrinal tests and
justifications for the presumption have varied significantly. During
the nineteenth century, U.S. courts interpreted federal law
consistently with prevailing international law limits on the exercise
of legislative jurisdiction, which at that time generally required
construing statutes to apply only territorially. In the twentieth
century, courts applied U.S. law abroad more frequently pursuant
to a variety of new doctrinal tests that were neither consistently
applied nor reconciled. While courts still sometimes invoked a
strictly territorial presumption, they also repeatedly applied U.S.
statutes to conduct abroad that produced effects in U.S. territory or
when doing so would be reasonable according to a multi-factor
balancing test. Beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court cited the
presumption more frequently and often, but not invariably, applied
a strictly territorial iteration of the presumption. As a consequence,
by 2010, there was general agreement that judicial application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality was incoherent and
unpredictable.1
Responding to these concerns, the Supreme Court in 2010
introduced a new two-part analysis in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd.2 Under Morrison, courts first determine whether a federal
statute applies extraterritorially by assessing whether Congress has
provided a “clear” or “affirmative” indication that it should.3 If not,
courts then determine whether application of the statute in a given
case would be impermissibly extraterritorial by identifying the
statute’s “focus” and assessing whether that focus occurred outside
the United States. The Morrison analysis was a significant change
from prior iterations of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Against this history, modern textualists must assess whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality is consistent with textualism
and, if not, whether textualism provides an alternate means of
1 Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV.
1019, 1028 (2011).
2 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
3 Id. at 265.
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assessing statutes’ territorial reach. Most fundamentally, textualism
instructs judges to give effect to the statutory text enacted by the
legislature,4 and textualists focus primarily on how a reasonable
reader would understand the statutory language “placed alongside
the remainder of the corpus juris.”5 Textualists accordingly embrace
linguistic canons, which help courts discern the meaning of
statutory text. By contrast, substantive canons that displace the best
or most plausible reading of the text contradict the textualist
principle “that a faithful agent must adhere to the product of the
legislative process.”6 Textualism therefore recognizes the legitimacy
of only those substantive canons that resolve statutory ambiguity
(rather than displacing the best reading of statutory text), or that
have been applied so consistently that they form part of the
background against which Congress legislates.7
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a substantive
canon because it requires courts to restrict the territorial reach of
federal law and thus implement a substantive policy external to the
statute at issue. As a consequence, unless it forms part of the
background against which Congress legislates, the presumption is
incompatible with textualism insofar as it is applied to displace the
best reading of the statutory text. Despite the presumption’s early
nineteenth century roots, its application has varied so frequently
and significantly that no single doctrinal standard qualifies as such
a background convention.
Judges seeking to comply with
textualism should therefore no longer apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality to displace the best reading of statutory
text. The Morrison analysis is particularly problematic for textualists
in this regard, notwithstanding the fact that it was articulated by
Justice Scalia, one of textualism’s staunchest proponents. Morrison
requires Congress to make its intent for a statute to apply
extraterritorially “clear”8 or “unmistakable,”9 supplanting the most
plausible reading of statutory text unless Congress legislates with
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003).
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 16 (2001) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).
6 Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 124 (2010).
7 Manning, supra note 4, at 2474.
8 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.
9 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).
4
5
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heightened clarity in direct contravention of textualists’ basic
directive that courts should function as Congress’s faithful agents.
While U.S. courts have not consistently applied any single
doctrinal test for the presumption against extraterritoriality, they
have fairly uniformly recognized that universally worded statutes
(referring to “any seaman,” for example) should be construed to
have some territorial limits. Consistent judicial reliance on different
iterations of the presumption in those circumstances gives rise to a
narrower background convention that accords with textualism:
Universally worded statutes that lack any express territorial
limitations should not be construed to apply throughout the world,
and courts may therefore read territorial limits into such statutes
consistently with textualist principles.
Textualism permits, and should be understood to require,
adopting a uniform test to interpret statutes that are universally
worded or are otherwise ambiguous as to their extraterritorial
applicability. Textualists recognize that judges have substantial
discretion to resolve statutory ambiguity and gaps, but simply
acknowledging that courts have discretion to construe universally
worded and ambiguous statutes pursuant to any of the iterations of
the presumption (and potentially even their own policy preferences)
is not a satisfactory outcome for textualist analysis. Applying a
consistent standard would better achieve textualist objectives of
consistency and predictability, and serve textualism’s “simple
ambition . . . to require legislators to accept responsibility for their
legislative acts.”10
Determining statutes’ extraterritorial reach is often difficult and
can implicate multiple States’ regulatory interests, international law,
fair notice for the regulated, and questions about the feasibility of
applying U.S. law abroad. Many approaches to the issue have
strengths and weaknesses, and none will be completely satisfactory
in all cases. Nonetheless, courts should not adopt the two-part
Morrison analysis. Morrison’s “focus” test, which determines
whether a statute is applied extraterritorially by reference to the
location of its “focus,” bears little relation to the question whether a
statute should apply in a given case as a matter of congressional
intent or policy. There is also little to suggest that the “focus” test
takes into account the considerations that underpin the presumption
against extraterritoriality, including international law, U.S. and
10 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 738 (1997).
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foreign sovereign interests, fairness, and comity. In addition, the
“focus” test is difficult to administer coherently, because identifying
a statute’s “focus” is inherently imprecise and uncertain and
because locating that “focus” in a specific case presents special
concerns for complex transnational cases.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the precise
contours of a new, uniformly applied substantive canon, but the
most promising approach appears to be a presumption that
Congress intends to legislate up to public and private international
law limits on legislative jurisdiction, at least with respect to civil law.
That approach would ensure that U.S. law governs where the United
States has substantial regulatory interests while avoiding
international conflicts that can arise when U.S. law is applied in
violation of international law limitations on legislative jurisdiction.
In addition, this approach best accords with textualist principles
because U.S. courts have long (albeit inconsistently) looked to
international law in applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
The conclusion that textualism should be understood to require
adopting a consistent approach for determining the extraterritorial
reach of universally worded and ambiguous statutes suggests a
broader insight. Where numerous statutes present a recurring
question of statutory interpretation that cannot be resolved by
reference to the usual tools of textualist statutory construction (just
as statutes are often ambiguous as to their geographic scope),
textualists should adopt a consistent substantive canon for resolving
that ambiguity. The judicial discretion that ambiguous statutes
necessarily entail can be harnessed to formulate new substantive
canons that permit courts to apply such statutes consistently and
predictably. That approach not only gives regulated parties fair
notice of the law, but also allows them to hold Congress accountable
for the predictable results of its legislation.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part 1 provides an overview
of the presumption against extraterritoriality and its application
over the past two centuries. Part 2 then examines the core tenets of
textualism and demonstrates that the presumption against
extraterritoriality, as it is currently applied, cannot properly be
classified as a canon of statutory interpretation that accords with
textualism. Part 3 contends that textualist judges should no longer
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality to displace the
best reading of the statutory text. For truly ambiguous statutes and
universally worded statutes that must be construed to have some
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limits, textualism should require a single consistent approach. Part
4 concludes that textualists should consider developing new
substantive canons whenever numerous statutes present a recurring
question of statutory interpretation that cannot be resolved using
the existing tools of textualist statutory construction.
1. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
U.S. courts have recognized for over 200 years that a statute
without any clear definition of its territorial reach should not be
construed to apply universally throughout the world.11 While the
presumption against extraterritoriality generally instructs courts to
avoid giving U.S. statutes extraterritorial effect,12 it has evolved
substantially, and sometimes dramatically, over time and has not
been applied consistently.13 Over the past decade (2010 through
2020), the Supreme Court has sought to restore order with a new
two-part analysis announced in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.14 The Morrison analysis marked a significant change from
previous iterations of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818).
See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.”); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))). See
generally Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 181.
13 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule
for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 128-29 (2010);
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1028 (“[T]he only thing courts and scholars seem to agree
on is that the law in this area is a mess.”); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test:
Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1460-61 (2008)
(“Condemned as incoherent and convoluted, a patchwork of incompatible rules
presently governs legislative jurisdiction. Some scholars go so far as to describe the
Court’s extraterritoriality decisions as patently inconsistent, if not hopelessly
confused.”); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 2162, 2235 (2002) (The presumption against extraterritoriality “has been
strongly critiqued both normatively and for its inconsistent application.”);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) (Justice Jackson, discussing the
extraterritorial application of shipping laws, admitted that “[i]t would not be
candid to claim that our courts have arrived at satisfactory standards or apply those
that they profess with perfect consistency.”).
14
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
11
12
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and it is not yet clear whether and how the new analysis will be
applied over the long term.
This section analyzes this evolution of the doctrinal tests and
rationales for the presumption against extraterritoriality over the
past 200 years in four parts: Before 1909, U.S. courts usually
construed U.S. law to apply only territorially in line with thenprevailing international law limits on legislative jurisdiction.
Between 1909 and 1991, U.S. courts applied U.S. law abroad more
often, developing a variety of different doctrinal tests and rationales.
Between 1991 and 2010, the Supreme Court frequently relied on the
presumption against extraterritoriality and often, but not
exclusively, interpreted it to require a strictly territorial construction
of U.S. law. Finally, over the past decade, the Supreme Court has
generally applied Morrison’s two-part analysis and has sought to
reconcile the varying rationales for the presumption.
1.1. Constitutional Background and Development of the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality Between 1804 and 1909
In order to conclude that a U.S. statute applies
extraterritorially,15 courts must determine both that Congress has
legislative jurisdiction (or the constitutional authority to legislate
extraterritorially),16 and that Congress exercised that authority.17
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress has the
constitutional power to enact extraterritorial legislation, ruling that
“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States.”18 While federal appellate courts
15
Traditionally statutes were generally understood to apply
“extraterritorially” when they regulated conduct occurring beyond U.S. borders.
Parrish, supra note 13, at 1462 (“When a state uses its legislative jurisdiction to
regulate the conduct of those outside its borders, the law has been applied
extraterritorially.”); Kramer, supra note 12, at 181.
16
Legislative jurisdiction, Congress’s power to make law, is distinct from the
executive branch’s enforcement jurisdiction or the judiciary’s adjudicative
jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987); Parrish, supra note 13, at 1462.
17 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945) (“[T]he only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the
liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so.”).
18 EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). The Court was likely referring to
Congress’s authority to prescribe law, not literally to enforce it. The Constitution
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have interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution to limit the extraterritorial applicability of
federal law (and particularly criminal law), they have very rarely
sustained due process challenges,19 and the Supreme Court has not
yet considered whether the Due Process Clause imposes any such
limits.20 It is generally accepted that Congress’s constitutional
authority to legislate extraterritorially is not diminished when
applying U.S. law abroad violates or may violate international law,21
although some federal appellate courts have looked to international
law in determining when the Due Process Clause prohibits
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.22 In sum, it is well-settled
that the Constitution does not categorically prohibit Congress from
enacting statutes that apply beyond U.S. borders and, on the
contrary, imposes few restrictions on Congress’s power to enact
such laws.
Given Congress’s broad constitutional authority, U.S. courts
need ordinarily conclude only that Congress in fact legislated
extraterritorially as “a matter of statutory construction” in order to

permits Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, to effectuate treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. cl. 18,
and to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” id. cl. 10. See
generally Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1030-31. Courts and commentators have for the
most part devoted relatively little attention to defining or elaborating these
potential sources of constitutional authority for Congress to legislate
extraterritorially. See Baston v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 850, 851 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (noting that “this Court has never
thoroughly explored the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96
VA. L. REV. 949, 951-52 (2010) (explaining that the Foreign Commerce Clause
“remains an incredibly under-analyzed source of congressional power”); Eugene
Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 150 (2009) (describing the impact of the Define and Punish
Clause on Congress’s power to legislate extraterritorially as “a serious and
previously unexplored question”).
19 Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Extraterritorial Application of Federal Criminal
Statutes: Analytical Roadmap, Normative Conclusions, and a Plea to Congress for
Direction, 106 GEO. L.J. 1021, 1080 (2018).
20 Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
323, 347 (2012).
21
Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 5 (1992); Meyer, supra note 13, at 125.
22
See cases cited infra note 358.
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apply a statute abroad.23 U.S. courts developed the presumption
against extraterritoriality for interpretive guidance because many
U.S. statutes are silent, ambiguous, or implausibly expansive as to
their extraterritorial reach.24 Applying such statutes without any
territorial limitations was regarded by courts as an absurd result that
Congress would not have intended, and which would have created
the potential for conflicts of law and friction with other nations. For
instance, in 1818, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Palmer25
that a reference to “any person or persons” in a statute penalizing
certain crimes committed “upon the high seas” was “broad enough
to comprehend every human being,” and must instead be limited
according to the “intent of the legislature.”26 Similarly, in 1953 in
Lauritzen v. Larsen,27 the Court noted that the Jones Act by its terms
applied to “any seaman,”28 and, “read literally,” provided recourse
in U.S. courts under U.S. law “to all alien seafaring men injured
anywhere in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign
nation.”29 Rejecting this literal reading as implausible, the Court
concluded that such generally worded statutes must be construed to
have some geographic limits.30
U.S.
courts
developed
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality in part by reference to rules of public international
law that prevailed early in the nineteenth century. The presumption
originated as an application of the Charming Betsy canon,31 which
required courts to construe U.S. statutes so as not to violate
international law unless no “other possible construction remains.”32
23 See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (“Both parties concede, as they must, that
Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of
the United States. Whether Congress has in fact exercised that authority . . . is a
matter of statutory construction.” (citation omitted)); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 284-85 (1949).
24
See Meyer, supra note 13, at 184-86 (providing extensive list of criminal laws
without any territorial limitation); Born, supra note 21, at 7 (“[I]n the overwhelming
majority of cases . . . federal statutes are couched in the most general terms and
suggest no meaningful geographic limits.”).
25
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
26
Id. at 631-32.
27
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
28 Id. at 576-77 (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (current version at 46
U.S.C. § 30104)).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 592-93.
31
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1058-60.
32
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1060.
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Specifically, the Charming Betsy canon instructed courts to determine
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes by construing them not to
violate international law limitations on the United States’ legislative
jurisdiction.
During the nineteenth century, the Charming Betsy canon and its
doctrinal offshoot, the presumption against extraterritoriality,
required the strictly territorial construction of U.S. law due to
corresponding international law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction.33
Under nineteenth century conceptions of international law, nationstates’ legislative jurisdiction was largely limited to their territorial
boundaries.34 Consequently, when U.S. courts applied the Charming
Betsy canon, they construed statutes to apply strictly territorially to
avoid violating those international law limits on legislative
jurisdiction.35 Narrow exceptions, such as nation-states’ rights to
assert legislative jurisdiction over their nationals abroad, were
acknowledged, but rarely invoked.36
For example, in 1824, the Supreme Court in The Apollon37
construed a federal statute to apply only within U.S. territory, based
on the principle that U.S. law should be interpreted not to violate
international law.38 In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court held
that U.S. customs law was not applicable to the French ship
“Apollon” while outside U.S. territory.39 Relying on “the general
principles of the law of nations,” the Court held that “[t]he laws of
no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far
as regards its own citizens.”40 Thus, it concluded that “general and
Born, supra note 21, at 8-21.
Id. at 8-19 (“Most public international law authorities vigorously embraced
the territoriality doctrine” and “Joseph Story’s classic Commentaries on the Conflict
of Laws . . . adopted a strictly territorial approach to choice of law . . . . Story’s
territoriality principle dominated conflict of laws thinking, in the United States and
elsewhere, during the nineteenth century.”).
35 Id. at 10 (“During the nineteenth century, a common application of the
Charming Betsy presumption was to incorporate the American understanding that
international law forbids the extraterritorial application of national laws.” (citing
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824); United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933))).
36
Id. at 13-14.
37 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
38 Id. at 369-70.
39 Id. at 368-72. The Court held that the Apollon was located in U.S. territory
under U.S. law, but not under international law, and consequently treated the
Apollon as though it were outside of U.S. borders. Id. at 368-69.
40 Id. at 369-70.
33
34
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comprehensive” provisions in U.S. law “must always be restricted
in construction, to places and persons, upon whom the Legislature
have authority and jurisdiction.”41
Almost a century later, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this strict version of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
The plaintiff, a U.S.
corporation, sued the defendant, also a U.S. corporation, for
anticompetitive behavior that had taken place abroad.43 In an
opinion authored by Justice Holmes, the Court held that the
Sherman Act did not apply,44 citing both conflict of laws (private
international law) and public international law principles.
Applying the then-prevailing “vested rights” conflict of laws
doctrine under which an act is governed by the law of the state in
which it occurred,45 the Court held that “[a]ll legislation is prima
facie territorial.”46 The Court also held that the extraterritorial
application of municipal law “would be unjust” and “an
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the
comity of nations.”47 Therefore, “in case of doubt,” statutes
containing general or universal language should be interpreted “as
intended to be confined in [their] operation and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power.”48
1.2. 1909-1991: Inconsistent Erosion of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
In the twentieth century, U.S. courts changed their approach to
interpreting the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes in several
Id. at 370.
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
43 Id. at 354-55.
44 Id. at 357.
45 Id. at 356. See generally William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-ofLaws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 121-23
(1998); Kramer, supra note 12, at 186-87.
46
213 U.S. at 357. Justice Holmes provided that “the general and almost
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done,” id. at 356,
recognizing the potential for certain narrow exceptions, id. at 355-56.
47 Id. at 356.
48 Id. at 357.
41
42
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important ways. First, U.S. courts weakened the presumption
against extraterritoriality to permit applying U.S. statutes abroad
more frequently, adopting an array of doctrinal tests and rationales
that were neither consistently applied nor reconciled.49 U.S. courts
at times continued to apply a strictly territorial version of the
presumption, but also construed statutes to apply extraterritorially
where the case had a sufficient nexus to the United States or the
conduct in question had produced effects in the United States.
Second, U.S. courts began to develop a presumption against
extraterritoriality that was independent of the Charming Betsy canon
and its reference to international law.50 At the same time, however,
courts also continued to cite international law and comity to justify
and give content to the presumption against extraterritoriality;51
they also occasionally invoked the Charming Betsy canon as a
separate hurdle to applying a statute extraterritorially.52
49
Discerning unifying themes in U.S. courts’ use of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy canon during the twentieth century is
difficult, but some commentators have nonetheless attempted to do so. See, e.g.,
Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of
Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 304 (1996) (“U.S.
law has been applied extraterritorially when that has served the national interest of
the United States or its corporate actors, and it has been given a territorial
application when a restrictive interpretation would serve those same ends.”);
Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 601 (1990) (“[C]ourts appear to be
using outcome-determinative tests to consistently grant or deny extraterritorial
claims according to the type of statute involved in the dispute. They consistently
grant extraterritorial relief under ‘market statutes,’ like the antitrust and securities
laws . . . . In contrast, ‘nonmarket statutes’ providing employment or
environmental protections are consistently denied extraterritorial applications.”).
50 See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (making no
reference to international law limits on legislative jurisdiction or to international
comity, and instead justifying the presumption based on Congress’s presumed
focus on domestic concerns).
51
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-82 (1953) (turning to international
law to determine extraterritorial applicability of the Jones Act); EEOC v. Aramco,
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that the presumption “serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result
in international discord”); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 164-67 (2004) (holding that U.S. law is construed to comport with international
law and comity, which the Court “must assume[] Congress ordinarily seeks to
follow”); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976)
(inquiring whether “[a]s a matter of international comity and fairness” the Sherman
Act should apply).
52
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 489-90 (1998)
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Finally, as international law and state practice, frequently led by
the United States, moved away from a strictly territorial conception
of legislative jurisdiction in the twentieth century, U.S. courts
relying on international law and comity in construing U.S. statutes
did so as well.53 Citing international law and state practice as they
had in the previous century, U.S. courts applied different tests and
reached different outcomes than they had previously.
1.2.1. Continued Application of a Strictly Territorial Version of the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The Supreme Court continued to apply a strictly territorial
version of the presumption against extraterritoriality in some cases
between 1909 and 1991. In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,54 for example, the
Court held that the Eight Hour Law, requiring overtime payments,
did not extend to a U.S. citizen employed in Iraq and Iran by private
contractors building public works for the U.S. government.55 The
Court held that “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
(“[C]ourts often invoke the Charming Betsy canon as a reason for construing
ambiguous statutes as not having extraterritorial effect. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has created a separate but related canon of construction for this issue, the
‘presumption against extraterritoriality.’ This presumption is designed, among
other things, to avoid constructions of statutes that would violate customary
international law. The Charming Betsy canon also is invoked as a justification for
limiting the reach of statutes that are found to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.” (footnotes omitted)).
53 See Born, supra note 21 at 21-29, 67-71 (“The U.S. position on
extraterritoriality has ultimately won a substantial measure of acceptance in the
international community. . . . These changes in state practice inevitably altered
customary international law limits on national legislative jurisdiction.”); Austen L.
Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815,
844-56 (2009) (“[O]ther countries have followed the American extraterritorial
example . . . . Over time, the United States’ broad application of its own law
extraterritorially has created a precedent . . . in other countries.”). An illustrative
example of the erosion of territorial notions of legislative jurisdiction in
international law is the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in
The Case of the S.S. Lotus. The court explicitly rejected the notion that the legislative
jurisdiction of states was limited to their territories and held instead that “national
regulatory efforts are presumptively valid and states claiming that assertions of
national jurisdiction violate international law have the burden of establishing this.”
Born, supra note 21, at 24-26 (citing The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10.).
54
336 U.S. 281.
55 Id. at 282-85.
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the United States.”56 The Court then determined that the Eight Hour
Law did not extend beyond U.S. territory because its language and
legislative history provided no affirmative indication that it did.57
This strictly territorial application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality was justified as “a valid approach whereby
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained . . . based on
the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions.”58
1.2.2. The Effects Test
During the same period (1909-1991), U.S. courts also employed
an effects test, which generally permits applying U.S. law to
extraterritorial conduct as long as it produces effects within the
United States. For instance, in Ford v. United States,59 foreign
defendants had participated in a conspiracy to import alcohol into
the United States in violation of the National Prohibition Act (NPA),
but had not entered U.S. territory.60 The Court held that the NPA
applied extraterritorially to the defendants based on “[t]he principle
that a man, who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force
to take effect in it, is answerable at the place where the evil is
done.”61
Similarly, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),62
the Second Circuit employed an effects test to determine the
extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman Act.63 Judge Learned
Hand wrote for the Second Circuit, which sat as the court of last
resort in unusual procedural circumstances.64 Alcoa held that courts
must construe statutes not to violate public international law or the
“limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of
their powers,” which it ruled “generally correspond to those fixed
Id. at 285.
Id. at 285-91.
58 Id. at 285.
59
273 U.S. 593 (1927).
60 Id. at 600-01, 623.
61 Id. at 619-24.
62
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
63 Id. at 443-44.
64
Dodge, supra note 45, at 124 (“Because the Supreme Court was unable to
muster a quorum of six Justices, [Alcoa] was referred to the Second Circuit, which
sat as the court of last resort.”).
56
57
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by the ‘Conflict of Laws,’” or private international law.65 The Second
Circuit thus looked to conflicts of law principles and public
international law, just as the Supreme Court had done in American
Banana.66 While the Supreme Court in American Banana had
formulated
a
strictly
territorial
presumption
against
extraterritoriality when applying these principles,67 the Second
Circuit instead adopted an effects test.68 The court held that the
Sherman Act applied extraterritorially to conduct abroad that was
intended to and did in fact have effects within the United States.69
The Second Circuit interpreted conflict of laws principles and public
international law to mandate a very different analysis than the
Supreme Court had 35 years earlier in American Banana, due in
significant part to perceived changes in public international law,
conflict of laws principles, and state practice.70
1.2.3. The Rule of Reason or Multi-Factor Analysis Derived From
Conflict of Laws Principles
Between 1909 and 1991, U.S. courts also cited conflict of laws
principles in adopting a rule of reason or multi-factor analysis for
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Conflict of laws
thinking evolved after American Banana was decided from the vested
rights theory to include a multi-factor analysis, sometimes termed
the “rule of reason.”71 U.S. courts that cited conflict of laws rules to
define the presumption against extraterritoriality adjusted the
doctrine accordingly. Under the rule of reason, courts determining
which state’s law should govern a case “choose from among the
interested states the one state with the ‘most significant relationship’
to the case.”72 Courts adapting the rule of reason to the presumption
against extraterritoriality used the same multi-factor analysis to
65
148 F.2d at 443 (“[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this
Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the
exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by
the ‘Conflict of Laws.’”).
66
213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
67
Id.
68
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
69
Id. at 443-44.
70
Born, supra note 21, at 31-32.
71
Dodge, supra note 45, at 121.
72 Id. at 127-34.
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determine whether to interpret U.S. law to apply to conduct or
effects occurring partly outside U.S. borders.73
For instance, the Supreme Court adopted a “connecting factor”
test derived partly from conflict of laws principles to determine the
extraterritorial applicability of the Jones Act in Lauritzen v. Larsen.74
A Danish sailor had been hired by a Danish citizen to work aboard
a Danish vessel while temporarily in the United States, and was
allegedly injured while aboard that ship in a Cuban harbor.75 The
Court first held, “in accord” with the Charming Betsy canon, that
“usage as old as the Nation” required interpreting U.S. shipping law
to apply extraterritorially only if the “international or maritime law”
on choice of law would provide for the application of U.S. law.76
International and maritime choice of law rules, the Court held,
mandated weighing the “connecting factors between the shipping
transaction regulated and the national interest served by the
assertion of authority” in order to resolve the conflict between
Danish and U.S. law.77 The Court concluded that the relevant factors
under that conflict of laws analysis, such as the place of the wrongful
act and the nationalities of the ship and plaintiff, counseled against
applying the Jones Act extraterritorially,78 and therefore construed
the Act not to apply to the sailor’s injury.79
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit combined an effects test with a rule
of reason analysis derived from conflict of laws rules to determine
the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial applicability in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America.80 The court reasoned that an effect on U.S.
commerce was “necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the
antitrust laws,” but not “a sufficient basis on which to determine
whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a
matter of international comity and fairness.”81 The court therefore
adopted a “jurisdictional rule of reason” that required weighing
numerous factors to assess the conflict of laws and determine
whether “in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United
73

127-34.
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1953); Dodge, supra note 45, at
345 U.S. at 582.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 576-82.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583-91.
Id. at 592-93.
549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 613.
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States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.”82 These factors included the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the effects of the extraterritorial conduct on
the United States as compared to any effects on other states, and the
nationality or location of the parties.83 The Ninth Circuit’s approach
in Timberlane proved influential, at least for a time, with numerous
lower courts following its reasoning and the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law later adopting a version of its multi-factor
analysis in Section 403.84
1.2.4. The “Nature of the Offense” Analysis
Between 1909 and 1991, U.S. courts also occasionally considered
whether Congress intended federal criminal law to apply
extraterritorially by reference to the “nature of the offense” being
regulated. In United States v. Bowman,85 the Supreme Court held that
extraterritorial applicability of U.S. criminal law depended on “the
purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the
crime” along with “territorial limitations upon the power and
jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of
nations.”86 The Court distinguished between statutes punishing
crimes committed against private individuals, which do not apply
abroad unless Congress “say[s] so in the statute,”87 and statutes that
“are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.”88 For crimes
against the government, Congress’s intent regarding extraterritorial
Id. at 614-15.
Id. at 614. The entire, but explicitly non-exhaustive, list of factors is “the
degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the
parties and the locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, the extent
to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.” Id.
84 See generally Born, supra note 21, at 35-39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
85
260 U.S. 94 (1922).
86 Id. at 97-98.
87 Id. at 98.
88 Id.
82
83
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applicability may “be inferred from the nature of the offense” being
regulated.89 Courts may infer that a statute applies extraterritorially
for offenses that “are such that to limit their locus to the strictly
territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds
as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign
countries as at home.”90
1.3. 1991-2010: Increased Application of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
Between 1991 and 2010, the Supreme Court frequently relied on
the presumption against extraterritoriality and often, but not
invariably, reverted to a strictly territorial version of the canon. The
rationales for the presumption against extraterritoriality shifted
away from international law towards Congress’s assumed domestic
focus and, to a lesser extent, separation of powers concerns. The
Court rarely cited international law and while it still asserted that
the presumption serves to prevent unintended conflicts of law, it
also repeatedly held that the presumption applies even absent any
such potential conflicts. During this period, the presumption
against extraterritoriality thus became almost entirely distinct from
the Charming Betsy canon and its direction that U.S. courts interpret
statutes not to violate international law.
In 1991, the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco),91 reaffirmed a strictly territorial approach to the
application of U.S. law, similar to that of American Banana. The
Court held that federal law “is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States” “unless a contrary intent
appears” for two reasons.92 First, a strictly territorial presumption
was said to implement “unexpressed congressional intent,”93
because the Court assumes that Congress “is primarily concerned
with domestic conditions” and “that Congress legislates against the
backdrop of the presumption.”94 Second, the presumption prevents
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id.
499 U.S. 244 (1991).
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/1

2020]

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

561

“unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.”95
Applying this strictly territorial version of the presumption, the
Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply
to a U.S. citizen hired in the United States by a U.S. company to
perform work in Saudi Arabia. The Court concluded that there was
no evidence of “the affirmative congressional intent required to
extend the protections of Title VII beyond our territorial borders.”96
Two years later, the Supreme Court issued two decisions—Smith
v. United States97 and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.98—
articulating
a
strictly
territorial
presumption
against
extraterritoriality that applied even though there were no potential
conflicts of law.99 In Smith, the Court ruled that the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) did not apply to a construction contractor for a
U.S. agency who died in Antarctica. The Court noted that Antarctica
“has no recognized government,”100 which made it unlikely that
another state would assert legislative jurisdiction over Smith’s death
there in conflict with the FTCA. The Court nonetheless held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was applicable, reasoning
that the canon serves not only to avoid conflicts with other nations’
laws, but also reflects “the commonsense notion that Congress
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”101
Shortly thereafter, in Sale, the Supreme Court similarly held that
the protections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA) did not extend to a group of Haitian migrants detained
outside of U.S. territory by the U.S. Coast Guard.102 The Court of
Appeals had ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality
was inapplicable because there was no risk that the relevant
Id.
Id. at 250-59.
97
507 U.S. 197 (1993).
98
509 U.S. 155 (1993).
99 In both cases the Court purported to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality only to bolster conclusions it had already reached by reference to
other tools of statutory interpretation. Smith, 507 U.S. at 203-05 (ruling that the
Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply extraterritorially largely due to the statute’s
text and structure, and relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality to
resolve “any lingering doubt”); Sale, 509 U.S. at 171-77 (holding that the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) did not apply to certain Haitian
migrants outside of U.S. territory based mainly on the text, structure, and history
of the INA, and relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality to bolster this
conclusion).
100 507 U.S. at 201.
101 Id. at 204 n.5.
102 509 U.S. at 158-60, 171-77, 188.
95
96
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provision of the INA, which was enforceable “only in United States
courts against the United States Attorney General, would conflict
with the laws of other nations.”103 The Supreme Court rejected that
conclusion and held that the presumption was applicable because it
“has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the
laws of other nations.”104 The Court instead alluded briefly to the
separation of powers as an alternate rationale, holding that the
“presumption has special force when we are construing treaty and
statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for
which the President has unique responsibility.”105
In other decisions issued between 1991 and 2010, however, the
Supreme Court did not apply a strictly territorial version of the
presumption against extraterritoriality, as it had in Aramco, Smith,
and Sale. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,106 decided just a
week after Sale, the Court did not invoke the presumption to restrict
the application of the Sherman Act. The Court cited precedent
specific to the Sherman Act holding that the Act “applies to foreign
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States,”107 and concluded that the
Sherman Act applied to foreign defendants’ actions in London
reinsurance markets that affected (and were intended to affect) the
U.S. insurance market.108 The Court left open whether U.S. courts
should refrain from applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially, on
the basis of principles of international comity, where there is a
conflict between U.S. and foreign law (holding in Hartford Fire there
was no need to do so because there was no conflict between British
and U.S. antitrust law).109
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 174, 188.
105
Id. at 188. The Court did not rely on the assumption that Congress
legislates with “domestic concerns in mind” because the INA explicitly addressed
immigrants. See id. at 206-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85,
97 (1998).
106
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
107 Id. at 795-96 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)).
108 Id. at 796-99.
109 Id. at 797-99. The Court ruled there was no such conflict even though the
London reinsurers claimed their conduct was consistent with British law because
they could have complied with both British and U.S. law. Id. at 798-99 (“No conflict
exists, for these purposes, ‘where a person subject to regulation by two states can
comply with the laws of both.’” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
103
104
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In F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran,110 the Supreme Court once
more justified the presumption against extraterritoriality by
reference to international law and comity, and applied a new and
relatively ill-defined reasonableness test for construing statutes to
comply with those principles.111 There, foreign plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Sherman Act by conduct occurring almost entirely
abroad, harming the plaintiffs outside of the United States, but also
causing independent, additional harm to others within the United
States.112 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
(FTAIA) specifically addressed the extraterritorial applicability of
the Sherman Act and provided that the Act applied to conduct
involving trade or commerce with foreign nations only “where
(roughly speaking) that conduct significantly harms imports,
domestic commerce, or American exporters.”113
The Court
construed the FTAIA to exclude the foreign plaintiffs’ claims from
the reach of the Sherman Act despite their allegation that the
defendants’ foreign conduct had impacted domestic commerce,
reasoning that the alleged domestic impact was independent of the
foreign harm for which the plaintiffs sought redress.114
In construing the FTAIA to exclude such claims, the Court cited
principles of international law and comity (including the multifactor
conflict-of-laws standard of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law), which it held Congress presumptively seeks to follow
under the Charming Betsy canon.115 The Court distilled those
principles into the mandate that statutes should ordinarily be
construed to “avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.”116 The Court then concluded that
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1987))). The
Court in Hartford Fire thus “embraced a highly restrictive vision of comity and
interests balancing in general.” Meyer, supra note 13, at 140; see also Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 820-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that “there is clearly a
conflict in this litigation,” because “[w]here applicable foreign and domestic law
provide different substantive rules of decision to govern the parties’ dispute, a
conflict-of-laws analysis is necessary”).
110
542 U.S. 155 (2004).
111 Id. at 164-67.
112 Id. at 158-59, 164.
113 Id. at 158 (citing Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. § 6a).
114
Id. at 164.
115
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987)).
116 Id.
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applying U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct and thereby
interfering “with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate
its own commercial affairs” is reasonable insofar as the law seeks to
redress domestic injury.117 The Court held such interference would
not be reasonable to redress only foreign harm, as the plaintiffs
requested in Empagran, because “the justification for that
interference seems insubstantial.”118
1.4. 2010-2020: The Morrison Analysis
By 2010, there was a general consensus that the presumption
against extraterritoriality was incoherent and unpredictable, and
that U.S. courts’ application of various different tests had led to
doctrinal confusion.119 Over the course of the next decade, the
Supreme Court sought to develop one generally applicable test for
the presumption against extraterritoriality and to reconcile the
varying rationales for the canon.120 That new test, a two-part
analysis announced in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.121 and
refined in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,122 marked a
Id. at 165.
Id.
119
John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40
SW. L. REV. 635, 636 (2011) (“[T]he confusion has worsened since the Court
purported to adopt a strict version of the presumption in the early 1990s.”);
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1028 (“[T]he only thing courts and scholars seem to agree
on is that the law in this area is a mess.”); Parrish, supra note 13, at 1460-61
(“Condemned as incoherent and convoluted, a patchwork of incompatible rules
presently governs legislative jurisdiction.”); Elhauge, supra note 13, at 2235 (The
presumption against extraterritoriality “has been strongly critiqued both
normatively and for its inconsistent application.”).
120
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there “are several reasons for” the
presumption against extraterritoriality and sought to explain how the different
rationales fit together. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct.
2090, 2100 (2016). The Court provided that the presumption is applied “across the
board,” “regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American
statute and a foreign law,” because the presumption serves not only “to avoid . . .
international discord,” but also “reflects the more prosaic ‘commonsense notion
that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’” Id. at 2100
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); and then
quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)). The Court also held
that while a risk of conflicts of law “is not a prerequisite for applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality, where such a risk is evident, the need to
enforce the presumption is at its apex.” Id. at 2107 (citation omitted).
121
561 U.S. 247.
122
136 S. Ct. 2090.
117
118
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significant change in U.S. courts’ interpretation of federal statutes’
extraterritorial reach and likely curtailed the number of federal
statutes that will be applied extraterritorially.123
In Morrison, the Supreme Court substantially altered earlier
formulations of the presumption against extraterritoriality. In an
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court adopted a two-part
analysis to determine (1) whether a statute applies extraterritorially
and, if not, (2) whether application of the statute would be
impermissibly extraterritorial pursuant to a new “focus” test.124
Australian plaintiffs owned shares in an Australian company,
National Australia Bank Limited (National), that were traded on an
Australian stock exchange.125 Plaintiffs alleged that National, along
with a U.S. company owned by National, engaged in deceptive
behavior in Florida that impacted the value of their National shares
in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).126 At the first step of the analysis, the Court
determined that § 10(b) did not apply extraterritorially because
there was no “clear” or “affirmative indication in the Exchange Act”
that it should apply extraterritorially.127
The Supreme Court then adopted a “focus” test to determine
whether applying § 10(b) to the facts presented in Morrison would
involve an extraterritorial application of the legislation and thus be
precluded by the presumption against extraterritoriality. The Court
reasoned that the presumption is “not self-evidently dispositive” in
cases like Morrison, where material facts arise both within the United
States and abroad.128 In these circumstances, ruling that a statute
like § 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially sheds no light on
whether its application is extraterritorial or domestic. In order to
123
See Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“Although the Supreme Court insists the presumption is
not a clear statement rule, recent cases have approached this bright-line
requirement.”).
124
561 U.S. at 266-70.
125 Id. at 251-52.
126 Id. at 251-53.
127 Id. at 265. The Court rejected the suggestion that this standard amounted
to a “clear statement rule” because “context can be consulted as well,” id., but that
strict articulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality will permit few
statutes to be applied abroad that do not explicitly provide for such application, Lea
Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of
American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 660 (2011).
128 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
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resolve that question, the Court examined whether the statute’s
“focus,” or the “objects of [its] solicitude,” occurred abroad such that
application of the statute in particular circumstances would qualify
as extraterritorial.129 The Court held that the focus of § 10(b) was
“upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States,” and
“not upon the place where the deception originated.”130 The Court
therefore concluded that applying § 10(b) to the deception in Florida
would be impermissibly extraterritorial because the purchases and
sales of the securities—the objects of the statute’s solicitude—
occurred on an Australian exchange.
Morrison significantly changed the presumption against
extraterritoriality in several ways. First, the Supreme Court assessed
separately whether § 10(b) of the Exchange Act applied
extraterritorially and whether its application in Morrison was
domestic or extraterritorial. Prior cases had not explicitly bifurcated
the analysis in that way, and had instead generally simply
determined whether a statute applied to the facts presented.131
Second, and relatedly, the “focus” test that the Court adopted at step
two of the analysis in order to assess whether a statute is applied
extraterritorially in a given case is new.132 That new “focus” test is a
significant change to the presumption because it permits courts to
define a statute’s application as territorial (and therefore
permissible) or extraterritorial (and therefore frequently
impermissible) by reference to the statutory “focus” discerned by
the court.133 Third, the Court opined in dicta that the first step of the
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 266.
131 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); F. Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); see generally Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 664 (“The
traditional one-step approach accommodated the same result without a second step
. . . .”).
132 The Court in Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266, cited EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244
(1991), which used the term “focus,” but did not apply a focus test. In Aramco, the
Court concluded that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act had “a purely domestic focus.”
499 U.S. at 255. The Court did not assess the regulatory focus of Title VII and then
examine whether the object of that focus had occurred in the United States in order
to determine whether application of the statute would be extraterritorial, as the
Court did in Morrison. See generally O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1059 (“[T]he
Morrison Court chose to create its own ‘focus’ test, which had no precedential
support.”); Knox, supra note 119, at 645.
133 The focus test permits courts to hold statutes inapplicable even where most
of the cause of action occurs within the United States by holding that the statute’s
focus is an element located outside of the United States. Conversely, when a
statute’s focus is a domestic element of a case, the focus analysis requires courts to
129
130
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Morrison analysis determines only whether a statute applies
extraterritorially or not.134 That strict dichotomy appears to
preclude courts from determining at step one that a statute applies
extraterritorially where conduct abroad has domestic effects,135 or
the United States has the most significant relationship to the case
pursuant to a multifactor test,136 as courts had previously done.
The Supreme Court’s next decision applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,137 did
not cite the “focus” test of Morrison. It instead held that the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) applies to “claims” that “touch and concern the
territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.”138 Nigerian
nationals had filed suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian
companies under the ATS,139 which grants U.S. district courts
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations.”140 Plaintiffs contended
that the defendant companies “aided and abetted the Nigerian
Government in committing violations of the law of nations in
Nigeria” and that the ATS therefore gave the district court
jurisdiction to hear the case and grant relief under international
law.141
The Court first concluded that it was constrained by the
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality in
exercising the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS to recognize as
federal common law causes of action under international law.142 The
substantive law applied pursuant to the ATS—international law that
is applied as a matter of federal common law—is not statutory and
is therefore not subject to limitation by a canon of statutory
interpretation. The Court acknowledged that it “typically appl[ies]
the presumption to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating
treat the statute as if it has no extraterritorial effect, even if a substantial part of the
cause of action occurs abroad.
134
The Court explained that “[i]f § 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need
to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them
(barring some other limitation).” 561 U.S. at 267 n.9.
135
United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
136
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571.
137
569 U.S. 108 (2013).
138 Id. at 124-25.
139 Id. at 111-12.
140
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
141
569 U.S. at 112-14.
142 Id. at 117, 124.
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conduct applies abroad” and that the ATS is “strictly jurisdictional,”
but nonetheless concluded that “[t]he principles underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality” “similarly constrain
courts . . . exercising their power under the ATS.”143 The Court cited
the purpose of the presumption against extraterritoriality to “help[]
ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an
interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences
not clearly intended by the political branches.”144
After examining the text, historical background, and
contemporaneous application of the ATS, the Court concluded “that
nothing in the statute rebuts” the presumption against
extraterritoriality.145 The Court then asserted that in Kiobel “all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States,” and held that
“even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”146 The Court
concluded that the defendants’ corporate presence in the United
States did not suffice.147 Although the Court did not elaborate on
what would satisfy the “touch and concern” test, its analysis seemed
to permit applying the ATS abroad when a cause of action has
significant connections to U.S. territory. The Supreme Court did not
mention Morrison’s focus test, which would instead require courts
to apply the ATS only if the “focus” of the Act occurred in the United
States, regardless whether the claims “touch and concern” U.S.
territory. Kiobel thus called into question whether and how the
analysis set forth in Morrison would be applied outside the context
of the Exchange Act.
However, in two decisions on the presumption against
extraterritoriality since Kiobel, the Supreme Court has twice applied
the two-step Morrison analysis and has characterized Kiobel as
Id. at 115-17.
Id. at 116-17.
145 Id. at 124.
146 Id. at 124-25. The Second Circuit ruled that the “touch and concern” part
of the Supreme Court’s opinion was dicta because its holding that “all the relevant
conduct took place outside the United States” was dispositive. Balintulo v. Daimler
AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190-91 & n.25 (2d Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Kiobel went on to say, however, that “mere corporate presence” does not suffice to
“touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.” 569
U.S. at 124-25. While the Court’s opinion is not entirely clear, the better reading is
that the “touch and concern” test is not dicta because the Court applied it to the
facts in Kiobel.
147 569 U.S. at 125.
143
144
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applying that analysis as well.148 In RJR Nabisco, the Court applied
Morrison’s “two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality
issues”149 to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO).150 RICO enumerates certain state and federal crimes
(predicates) that implicate RICO when they form “part of a ‘pattern
of racketeering activity’—a series of related predicates that together
demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal
activity.”151 RICO imposes “prohibitions aimed at different ways in
which a pattern of racketeering activity may be used to infiltrate,
control, or operate” certain enterprises.152 RICO prescribes criminal
liability for violations of these prohibitions and creates a private
right of action on the same basis for “[a]ny person injured in his
business or property.”153 At issue in RJR Nabisco were claims by the
European Community and 26 of its Member States against RJR
Nabisco and related entities pursuant to that private right of
action.154
The Court in RJR Nabisco held that the Morrison analysis applies
“regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct,
affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.”155 The Court therefore
148
In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), the
Supreme Court held that both Kiobel and Morrison “reflect a two-step framework
for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” Id. at 2101. The Court explained that in
Kiobel it “did not need to determine, as [it] did in Morrison, the statute’s ‘focus’”
because all relevant conduct occurred abroad. Id. at 2100-01. That mischaracterizes
Kiobel. Instead of applying the “focus” test, the Court in Kiobel held that claims
under the ATS could “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application,” but
that the Kiobel defendants’ corporate presence in the United States did not suffice.
569 U.S. at 124-25. A concurrence by two Justices in Kiobel had applied Morrison’s
“focus” test to the ATS, but the majority did not adopt that reasoning or refer to the
focus test. Id. at 126-27 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that Morrison’s “focus”
test permits applying the ATS only where “the domestic conduct is sufficient to
violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness
and acceptance among civilized nations”).
149
136 S. Ct. at 2101. The Supreme Court ruled that a court must first assess
“whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted” by a clear
indication that it applies abroad, and second “determine whether the case involves
a domestic application of the statute . . . by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’” Id.
150
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
151 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2096-97 (citing § 1961).
152 Id. at 2097 (citing § 1962).
153 Id. (citing §§ 1963(a), 1964(c)).
154 Id. at 2098.
155 Id. at 2101. This requirement for Congress to “reiterate its extraterritorial
intent in every provision of a statute, whether jurisdictional, substantive, or
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applied the Morrison analysis separately to RICO’s substantive
prohibitions and its private right of action. The Court first held that
RICO’s substantive prohibitions156 applied extraterritorially insofar
as the statutes defining its predicate offenses “manifest[] an
unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially.”157
The Court assumed that the alleged predicate offenses in RJR
Nabisco were committed in the United States or “in violation of a
predicate statute that applies extraterritorially” because RJR
Nabisco did not challenge the Second Circuit’s ruling to that
effect.158
The Court next turned to RICO’s private right of action for
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
The Court
violation of” RICO’s substantive prohibitions.159
concluded that there was no clear indication that RICO’s private
right of action applied extraterritorially, and that “[a] private RICO
plaintiff therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury to its
business or property.”160 The Court’s opinion did not address the
separate steps of the Morrison analysis, but its holding implies that
the “focus” of RICO’s private right of action is the plaintiff’s injury,
so the injury must occur in the United States in order for the statute’s
application to be domestic. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs’
claims failed because the plaintiffs had “waiv[ed] their damages
claims for domestic injuries.”161
The Court’s next ruling on the presumption against
extraterritoriality—WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.162—
appeared to retreat from the requirement announced in RJR Nabisco
to apply the presumption separately to every statutory provision.
The Court in WesternGeco applied the Morrison test to a provision of
remedial,” is new, and it erects yet another hurdle to applying U.S. law abroad.
Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 134,
141-42 (2016).
156 The Court reserved judgment on the extraterritorial application of two of
RICO’s substantive prohibitions, § 1962(a), (d), upon which the parties had not
focused in their briefing. 136 S. Ct. at 2103.
157 136 S. Ct. at 2102.
The Court’s requirement for “unmistakable
congressional intent” further increased the clarity with which statutes must indicate
extraterritorial applicability from Morrison’s requirement for a “clear” or
“affirmative indication.” 561 U.S. at 265.
158
136 S. Ct. at 2105.
159 Id. at 2106 (quoting § 1964(c)).
160 Id. at 2106-08.
161 Id. at 2111.
162
138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
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the Patent Act permitting patent owners to recover damages for the
export of components of infringing products from the United
States.163 Section 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act provided for liability for
such infringement,164 while Section 284 authorized “damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement.”165 The question
presented was whether these provisions allowed the plaintiff to
recover lost profits incurred abroad.166
The Court started with step two of the Morrison analysis to avoid
“resolving difficult questions that do not change the outcome of the
case, but could have far-reaching effects in future cases.”167
Specifically, the Court declined to decide whether “the presumption
against extraterritoriality should never apply to statutes . . . that
merely provide a general damages remedy for conduct that
Congress has declared unlawful.”168 The Court thus appeared to
retreat from its unqualified ruling in RJR Nabisco that the
presumption applies “regardless of whether the statute in question
regulates conduct [or] affords relief.”169
The Court then concluded that the focus of Section 284, which
provides for “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement,”170 was generally “the infringement” and in any
particular case was determined by the provision imposing
substantive liability for infringement.171 The Court explained that
the focus of Section 271(f)(2) was on “the domestic act” of supplying
infringing components “in or from the United States.”172 Recovery
of foreign lost profits was therefore a permissible domestic
application of Section 284, as long as the components at issue were
supplied from the United States in violation of Section 271(f)(2).173

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

35 U.S.C. § 284.
WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct at 2134-35 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)).
Id. at 2135 (quoting § 284).
Id. at 2134.
Id. at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 2137 (quoting § 284).
Id. at 2137-38.
Id. at 2138.
Id. at 2137-38.
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1.5 The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in 2020
Over the past decade (2010-2020), the Supreme Court has twice
affirmed Morrison and has, it appears, firmly established its two-step
analysis as the new presumption against extraterritoriality. The
Morrison analysis has nonetheless been the subject of substantial
scholarly criticism,174 and it is not yet clear whether that analysis will
or should govern in the long term.
It appears clear that Morrison is difficult to administer coherently
in practice. For instance, as other critics have observed, the concept
of a statute’s “focus” is undefined and ambiguous, and the Court’s
instruction that “the object of the statute’s solicitude . . . can turn on
the conduct, parties, or interests that it regulates or protects”175
provides lower courts with little meaningful guidance in assessing
which aspects of a statute should be deemed the “focus” for
purposes of determining extraterritoriality.176 The “focus” test also
gives rise to uncertainty in complex transnational disputes when
courts seek to determine where the object of a statute’s solicitude is
located in a particular case.177

174
See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 656 (concluding that Morrison’s
“reworking of the presumption against extraterritorial application of American
federal statutes is peddled as an antidote to federal judges run amok,” but that the
“new approach provides considerably greater opportunity for creative judging
than the method it replaces”); O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1060 (“Although
Morrison’s focus test was designed to promote predictability and clear jurisdictional
line-drawing, it is unlikely to serve those ends.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining
Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 342 (2014) (criticizing Morrison’s
“focus” test as “entirely circular”).
175
WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 2138 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
176
See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1060 (“The test is difficult to apply
because Congress does not normally identify a statutory focus. Commentators are
rightly concerned that it is therefore manipulable and subjective.” (footnote
omitted)); Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1673, 1700 (2012) (“[E]ncouraging courts to . . . engage in a ‘focus’ analysis
contributes little but obfuscation to the legislative jurisdiction analysis. . . .
Presently, the test is so unformed that lower courts have almost no guidance on
how to proceed in a principled way.”).
177
Aaron D. Simowitz, The Extraterritoriality Formalisms, 51 CONN. L. REV. 375,
379 (2019); see Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326
(2015) (“Territoriality . . . depends on the ability to define the relevant ‘here’ and
‘there,’ and it presumes that the ‘here’ and ‘there’ have normative significance. The
ease and speed with which data travels across borders, the seemingly arbitrary
paths it takes, and the physical disconnect between where data is stored and where
it is accessed critically test these foundational premises.”).
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In addition, the Court has left unanswered two significant
questions about when the Morrison analysis applies. First, RJR
Nabisco and WesternGeco do not provide lower courts clear direction
as to which statutory provisions must separately be examined
pursuant to the presumption against extraterritoriality. In RJR
Nabisco, the Court held that the presumption applies regardless
whether a statute “regulates conduct [or] affords relief,”178 but two
years later, in WesternGeco, the Court declined to decide whether the
presumption “should never apply” to “general damages
remed[ies].”179 Similarly, RJR Nabisco implied that the focus of
RICO’s private right of action was on the plaintiff’s injury and was
thus independent from the focus of the liability provisions,180 while
WesternGeco assessed the focus of the Patent Act’s damages remedy
by reference to the provisions establishing liability.181 The Court in
WesternGeco sought to distinguish RJR Nabisco on the grounds that
the private right of action at issue there involved “a substantive
element of a cause of action, not a remedial damages provision,”182
but the Court did not explain why that distinction is either relevant
or decisive. It also left open whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies separately to each element of a cause of
action, to each element that is set forth in a separate statutory
provision, or to some other subset of elements and provisions.183
Second, although the Supreme Court held in RJR Nabisco that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies “regardless of
whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or
merely confers jurisdiction,”184 there is reason to doubt that the
Court will apply the presumption separately to most jurisdictional

178
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
The Court therefore applied the presumption separately to RICO’s private cause of
action and provisions imposing liability. Id. at 2106.
179
138 S. Ct. at 2136.
180
136 S. Ct. at 2111.
181
138 S. Ct. at 2137-38.
182
Id. at 2138.
183 Cf. Carlos M. Vázquez, Out-Beale-Ing Beale, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 68, 70-71
(2016) (observing that the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco “did not explain why it
singled out the place of injury instead of [the] other elements of the cause of action”
created by Section 1964(c) of RICO); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Building A Wall Against
Private Actions for Overseas Injuries: The Impact of RJR Nabisco v. European
Community, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 23-27 (2016).
184
136 S. Ct. at 2101.
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provisions.185 The Court in RJR Nabisco cited Kiobel to justify its
conclusion that the presumption applies separately to related
statutory provisions, reasoning that the Alien Tort Statute at issue in
Kiobel was “strictly jurisdictional.”186 That citation was inapposite.
Kiobel was an unusual case because there was no substantive U.S.
statute to which the Court could have separately applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality; the ATS grants courts
jurisdiction to recognize as federal common law causes of action
under international law.187 Kiobel therefore cannot stand for the
proposition that other jurisdictional provisions must separately pass
muster under the presumption against extraterritoriality.188
In addition, as numerous commentators have explained,
applying the presumption separately to jurisdictional provisions is
“ill-advised” and “irreconcilable with the Court’s reasoning in other
recent cases—including other portions of RJR Nabisco.”189 Congress
generally does not specify extraterritorial applicability in
jurisdictional statutes, and even in RJR Nabisco the Court did not
separately apply the presumption to the general federal question
statute.190
2. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH TEXTUALISM
With this background on the presumption against
extraterritoriality we can assess whether the canon complies with
textualist tenets. Textualism instructs courts to give effect to the
statutory text, read in context and against the remainder of the
corpus juris. Textualists therefore embrace linguistic canons that
help discern the meaning of statutory text. Substantive canons that
185
William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not
Apply
to
Jurisdictional
Statutes,
OPINIO
JURIS
(July
1,
2016),
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/ [https://perma.cc/5XJH-ZTEL].
186
136 S. Ct. at 2106 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116
(2013)).
187
569 U.S. at 116. The Court acknowledged that it “typically appl[ies] the
presumption to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies
abroad,” and concluded that the “principles underlying the presumption against
extraterritoriality” “similarly constrain . . . courts exercising their power under the
ATS” to recognize causes of action. Id. at 116-17.
188
Dodge, supra note 185.
189
Gardner, supra note 155, at 142; see also Dodge, supra note 185.
190
Dodge, supra note 185 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
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instruct courts to displace the best reading of a statute on the basis
of an extrinsic policy are, by contrast, contrary to the textualist
principle “that a faithful agent must adhere to the product of the
legislative process.”191 Textualists therefore endorse only the subset
of such substantive canons that have been applied so consistently
that they form part of the background against which Congress
legislates. Substantive canons that function only as tiebreakers to
help courts choose among equally plausible interpretations are also
permissible under textualism because they do not supplant
Congress’s instructions.
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a substantive
canon because, generally speaking, it instructs courts to further the
policy of limiting U.S. law to U.S. territory. The presumption may
therefore be applied to displace the best reading of statutory text
consistently with textualism only if the presumption forms part of
the longstanding background conventions against which Congress
legislates. Despite the presumption’s roots in the early nineteenth
century, U.S. courts’ application of the canon has varied so
frequently and dramatically that no single doctrinal standard forms
part of the background against which Congress legislates. Courts’
consistent reliance on the presumption against extraterritoriality in
one form or another to restrict the applicability of universally
worded statutes (referring to “any seaman,”192 for example) has,
however, given rise to a narrower background convention that
complies with textualist tenets: Such universally worded statutes
that contain no express territorial limitations should not be
construed to apply throughout the world. As a consequence, courts
may construe such statutes to have territorial limits consistently
with textualism; importantly, however, in discerning what these
territorial limits are, textualism requires one uniformly-applied test,
which has thus far been badly lacking.

Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 124.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1952) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)).
191
192

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

576

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

2.1. Textualism and Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Modern textualism was developed in the late twentieth century,
in large part by Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook.193 Most
fundamentally, textualism requires judges to give effect to the
statutory text enacted by the legislature.194 Textualists conceive of
U.S. courts as the “faithful agents” of Congress,195 and maintain that
the best way for judges to respect legislative supremacy is to focus
on the meaning of the statutory text in context.196 Textualism
maintains that “courts must enforce a clearly worded statutory text
even when its semantic import does not fully capture the statute’s
apparent purpose,”197 and reject the notion that courts should
separately seek to divine and implement Congress’s “true
intentions.”198
Textualists ascribe primary importance to the statutory text for
two main reasons. First, only statutes—“not legislative history, not
legislative purpose, not legislative ‘intent’—have gone through the
constitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of law.”199
Second, textualists maintain that “multi-member legislatures do not
have an actual but unexpressed ‘intent’ on any materially contested
Specifically, textualists contend that
interpretive point.”200
193
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 41920 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent]; John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73 (2006)
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists]. Textualism has
been evolving since its inception in the 1980s. See generally John F. Manning, SecondGeneration Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2010) [hereinafter Manning,
Second-Generation]. I focus on the currently prevalent “second-generation”
textualism. Id. at 1289-90.
194
Manning, supra note 4, at 2390.
195
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 424, 430.
196
Manning, supra note 4, at 2456-58.
197
Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 193, at 1304. Textualism was
conceived in part as a reaction to and refutation of purposivism. See Manning, What
Divides Textualists From Purposivists, supra note 193, at 71-73; Manning, SecondGeneration, supra note 193, at 1291-92. Purposivists traditionally maintained that
judges should discern and implement Congress’s true intentions, including by
reference to legislative history, even if the statutory text fails to capture or even
contradicts that true intent. See Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists,
supra note 193, at 71-72.
198
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 420-21.
199
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 416 (1989).
200
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 420.
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legislators instead have individual “desires, priorities, and
preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to
aggregate.”201 Textualists also claim “that the (often unseen)
complexities of the legislative process make it meaningless to speak
of ‘legislative intent’ as distinct from the meaning conveyed by a
clearly expressed statutory command.”202 Finally, textualists
maintain that legislation is “often the product of compromise” so
that “judges cannot reliably use idealized background legislative
intent as a ground for deviating from a clear and specific statute.”203
Textualism instead instructs judges to determine “how ‘a skilled,
objectively reasonable user of words’ would have understood the
statutory text.”204 Rather than looking for actual congressional
intent, textualists “focus primarily on ‘“objectified” intent—the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the
law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.’”205
Textualists thus do not limit statutory interpretation to the “four
corners” of a statute, and they “believe that statutory language, like
all language, conveys meaning only because a linguistic community
attaches common understandings to words and phrases, and relies
on shared conventions for deciphering those words and phrases in
particular contexts.”206 Textualists accordingly consult dictionaries
and “pay attention to the glosses often put on language (even in
ordinary usage) [and] the specialized connotations of established
terms of art.”207
Textualists also apply canons of statutory interpretation.208
Canons are generally divided into linguistic and substantive
201

(1983).

Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48

Manning, supra note 4, at 2390.
Id. at 2410; see also Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 193, at 1304
(Textualists recognize that “legislation often represents unknowable compromise,
that compromise often requires legislators to embrace means that do not fully
effectuate the ends that inspired the law’s enactment, and that judges who pursue
a statute’s background purposes at the expense of its implemental detail therefore
risk undermining rather than furthering the legislative design.”).
204
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 434 (quoting
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988)).
205
Manning, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17).
206
Id. at 108-09.
207
Id. at 109-10.
208
Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 121. Canons are rules of thumb or
“interpretive principle[s] that judges have customarily used” to aid them in
202
203
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canons,209 although commentators have adopted different terms for
grouping the canons.210 Textualists embrace linguistic canons,
which set forth rules on how language in general and statutes in
particular communicate meaning, and often deal with grammar or
statutory structure.211 For instance, the expressio unius canon
provides that “[t]he expression of one thing” in a statutory provision
“implies the exclusion of others.”212 Textualists favor the use of
linguistic canons because they “deem it essential to foster clear and
predictable linguistic and syntactic rules to permit legislators and
interpreters to decode enacted texts.”213 Linguistic canons align
with textualists’ focus on the statutory text in context because their
“very purpose is to decipher the legislature’s intent.”214
Substantive canons instruct courts to construe statutes to further
policies extrinsic to the statute at issue.215 Some substantive canons
“serve simply as tie breakers between two equally plausible
interpretations of a statute,” while others require courts to “forgo
the most plausible interpretation of a statute in favor of one in better
accord with some policy objective.”216 Textualist judges often apply
substantive canons,217 but they are difficult to reconcile with
interpreting and applying statutes. Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons
of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and
Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 543 (1997-1998).
209
Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117 (Canons are “traditionally classified as
either linguistic or substantive.”).
210 See id. at 117 n.27; Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn?
Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992)
(distinguishing between “descriptive” and “normative” canons).
211 See Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117, 121; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW 51 (2012) (“In whatever age or culture, human intelligence
follows certain principles of expression that are as universal as principles of
logic. . . . [These canons] are not ‘rules’ of interpretation in any strict sense but
presumptions about what an intelligently produced text conveys.”).
212
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 211, at 107-11.
213
John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283,
291-92 (2002).
214
Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117.
215
Id. at 117-18; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593, 595-96 (1992).
216
Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117-18.
217
Id. at 122-23 (citing Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S.
340, 345-46 (1998) (Thomas, J.), and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224, 270 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting), for the constitutional avoidance canon; citing
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-21 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
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textualism unless they function merely as tiebreakers that resolve
truly ambiguous statutory text.218 Substantive canons that instruct
courts to depart from the best reading of the statutory text in context
are contrary to “the usual textualist practice of interpreting a statute
as it is most likely to be understood by a skilled user of the language”
and “the more fundamental textualist insistence that a faithful agent
must adhere to the product of the legislative process, not strain its
language to account for abstract intention or commonly held social
values.”219 Indeed, Justice Scalia questioned “where the courts get
the authority to impose” substantive canons, and “doubt[ed]” that
courts can “really just decree that [they] will interpret the laws that
Congress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly say.”220
Textualists contend that some substantive canons are
nonetheless compatible with their approach to statutory
interpretation because they have become so ingrained that they
constitute part of the background against which Congress
legislates.221 According to Justice Scalia, once canons “have been
long indulged, they acquire a sort of prescriptive validity, since the
legislature presumably has them in mind when it chooses its

for the Charming Betsy canon; citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997) (Thomas, J.), and Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring), for the presumption against retroactivity;
citing Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 399 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and
EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), for the presumption against extraterritoriality; citing
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J.), for the rule of lenity). See
also Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 762 (2013) (“But, in practice, even though
[Justice Scalia] is one of the most vocal opponents of federal common law making,
he is one of the most prolific users of both textual and policy canons.”).
218
Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 123-24.
219
Id. at 124. See also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1542-43 (1998) (“But the problem is that the
substantive, dice-loading canons risk the normative appeal of the new textualism:
they are, as Scalia says, potentially undemocratic because they are judge-made
presumptions and rules that Congress has a hard time trumping . . . and [they are]
potentially destabilizing if judges succumb to the temptation of creating new
canons or adjusting old ones to their changing tastes.”).
220
SCALIA, supra note 5, at 28-29; see also Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990) (“I should think
that the effort, with respect to any statute, should be neither liberally to expand nor
strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to get the meaning precisely right.”).
221
See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 29 (“The rule of lenity is almost as old as the
common law itself, so I suppose that [it] is validated by sheer antiquity.” (footnote
omitted)).
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language.”222 Dean John Manning explains that “[t]his interpretive
approach follows from the textualists’ conception of meaning: . . .
the meaning of a text depends on the shared background
conventions of the relevant linguistic community,” so that courts
construing statutes “should consult the assumptions of a reasonable
person conversant with legal conventions.”223
Because this
justification depends upon canons’ longstanding application,
textualists “must largely accept the world as they find it, treating the
existing set of background conventions as a closed set.”224

222
Scalia, supra note 220, at 583. Similarly, Dean John Manning concludes that
textualists employ canons of statutory construction, “including some substantive
(policy-oriented) canons that have come to be accepted as background assumptions
by virtue of longstanding prescription.” Manning, What Divides Textualists From
Purposivists, supra note 193, at 82.
223
Manning, supra note 4, at 2467. Even when the substantive canons are
applied so consistently that they attain the status of “shared background
conventions,” they do not become linguistic conventions in the sense that they form
part of the way the legal community understands language. Many lawyers are
likely at best superficially familiar with the most prominent substantive canons,
and would need to consult treatises or precedent in order to determine how a
specific substantive canon outside their regular practice applies. Distinguishing
this type of shared substantive framework from linguistic conventions does not
diminish the textualist claim that those substantive canons form part of the shared
background between Congress and legal practitioners.
224
Id. at 2474 (emphasis added). See also Eskridge, supra note 219, at 1543
(examining the compatibility of substantive canons with textualism and concluding
that “[t]he longstanding substantive canons can be viewed as conventions
underlying congressional deliberations,” but identifying problems with this view
when the Supreme Court modifies those canons or applies them inconsistently). I
will treat textualists’ acceptance of a “closed set” of longstanding and consistently
applied substantive canons as a valid textualist tenet for purposes of this paper, but
the matter is not entirely uncontroversial. For instance, Judge Barrett contends that
the concept of a “closed set” cannot be justified on the basis that judicial
development of substantive background norms is “a legitimate part of a legal
system’s evolution” but “dissipates once the legal system is mature.” Coney
Barrett, supra note 6, at 161. Furthermore, an empirical study by Professors Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman indicates that the congressional staffers who
generally draft legislation may be unaware of some commonly-applied canons.
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901, 945-47 (2013). Judge Barrett counters that linguistic canons at least are
compatible with textualism insofar as they track common usage, regardless
whether “Congress rejects them” because “courts are entitled to adopt a default
presumption that Congress legislates in the language of the ordinary reader.” Amy
Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2204-05
(2017).
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2.2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Is a Substantive
Canon
The presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts to
construe statutes’ extraterritorial reach by reference to principles
and policies that are extrinsic to the statute at issue. Most
fundamentally, the canon has generally required courts to interpret
statutes to apply only within U.S. territory.225 More specifically,
courts applying the presumption against extraterritoriality have
construed statutes’ geographic scope in conformity with public
international law governing prescriptive jurisdiction,226 conflict of
laws principles,227 international comity principles,228 an assumed
congressional focus on domestic issues,229 and separation of powers
concerns.230 Each of these iterations of the presumption requires
courts to construe statutes according to an extra-statutory policy—
ranging from compliance with international law or comity to the
notion that U.S. law should presumptively not apply beyond U.S.
borders—and none are focused on deciphering the statutory text by
reference to rules about grammar or statutory structure. The
presumption against extraterritoriality is therefore fairly clearly a
substantive canon.231
Courts and commentators have at times sought to frame the
presumption against extraterritoriality as linguistic, as descriptive
of the way in which Congress legislates, or as a constitutionally
225
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (describing the
presumption against extraterritoriality as “[t]he presumption that United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world”).
226
See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); Am. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (relying partly on public international law
conceptions of national sovereignty in addition to conflict of laws principles); F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (holding that U.S.
law is construed to comport with customary international law, which the Court
“must assume[] Congress ordinarily seeks to follow”).
227 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
228
See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-67 (applying “principles of prescriptive
comity”).
229 See, e.g., EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
230
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013) (“For
us to run interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must be
present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957))).
231 See Sunstein, supra note 199, at 460.
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inspired clear statement rule, but these labels are inapposite. In
United States v. Delgado-Garcia,232 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit described the presumption against extraterritoriality as
a “linguistic convention.”233 The court held that the presumption
“embodies sensible contextual linguistic reasons for reading the plain
texts of domestic statutes not to apply everywhere in the world.”234
The court reasoned that “[b]ecause Congress’s primary arena of
sovereignty is the territorial United States, it makes sense to
presume, absent other evidence, that its commands linguistically
apply only there.”235
This
characterization
of
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality as linguistic is unpersuasive. The presumption
instructs courts to implement substantive policies and principles in
construing statutes to apply (generally speaking) only within U.S.
borders, and it is therefore substantive and not linguistic.236 There
is also no indication that English speakers in the United States
assume that all words or proscriptions refer only to things within
U.S. borders,237 or understand all statutory language to apply only
within U.S. borders.238 Even for the linguistic community of those
who draft and interpret U.S. law, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is too complex and too dependent upon concepts
of law and territorial sovereignty to plausibly be said to form part of
374 F.3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1345.
234 Id. at 1344 (emphasis added).
235 Id. (emphasis added).
236
See supra notes 215-16, 225-31 and accompanying text. See also Kramer,
supra note 12, at 184 (“The Court’s decision [in Aramco] thus reflects a normative
judgment that it is preferable to restrict American law.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 682
(1999) (“Most of the substantive canons are hard if not impossible to defend on
ordinary-use-of-language or this-is-what-the-legislature-would-want grounds.”).
237
For instance, if a doctor instructed a patient not to run marathons, the
patient would almost certainly understand that the prohibition applies both inside
and outside U.S. borders.
238
Any assumptions as to whether U.S. law applies abroad are based on
substantive considerations that are informed by the kind of legislation at issue. For
instance, English speakers in the United States would likely not assume that federal
legislation prohibiting the provision of material assistance to foreign terrorist
groups, governing the conduct of U.S. soldiers, prohibiting the payment of bribes
to foreign officials, or prohibiting the importation of illicit drugs or firearms into
the United States applies only within U.S. borders. By contrast, English speakers in
the United States may well assume that federal law governing different kinds of
behavior, such as the possession of controlled substances, sale of pornography, and
possession of firearms, would not apply to them overseas.
232
233
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a shared understanding about the meaning of statutory text. The
Morrison analysis, for example, requires interpreters of statutory text
to apply a two-part test and consult the Court’s relevant precedent;
similarly, the standards in Lauritzen, Timberlane, and Section 403 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law require application of
a multi-factor balancing test. Neither these nor other iterations of
the presumption address or explain how Congress ordinarily uses
language.
Incorrectly
classifying
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality as linguistic has serious consequences. As Judge
Coney Barrett warned, “canons that ostensibly advance substantive
values are sometimes rationalized as functionally linguistic,”
because “linguistic canons, which pose no challenge to legislative
supremacy, are preferable to substantive canons, which do.”239
Defining the presumption against extraterritoriality as linguistic
automatically validates the canon and obviates the need to assess
whether the substantive justifications that courts and commentators
have offered for the canon are valid.
The Supreme Court has at times framed the presumption against
extraterritoriality as descriptive of the way Congress legislates, but
that is also not a sound characterization or persuasive justification
of the canon. In Morrison, for example, the Court held that the
presumption “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic . . . matters.”240 That assertion
about Congress’s usual focus is an unproven empirical assumption.
Many statutes are silent as to their extraterritorial reach or contain
no territorial limitations,241 and it is not clear that Congress
ordinarily considers or forms a view as to extraterritoriality.242 The
assumption that Congress “is primarily concerned with domestic

Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 120.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). Professor
Caleb Nelson has also described the presumption against extraterritoriality as a
canon that “reflect[s] observations about Congress’s own habits.” Caleb Nelson,
What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 390 (2005).
241
See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 13, at 184-86 (providing extensive list of criminal
laws without any territorial limitation); Born, supra note 21, at 7 (“In the
overwhelming majority of cases . . . federal statutes are couched in the most general
terms and suggest no meaningful geographic limits.”).
242
See Clopton, supra note 123, at 13 (concluding that “[i]n many
circumstances, Congress may be agnostic”); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the
Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 393 (1980) (providing that “in the vast
majority of cases, legislatures have no actual intent on territorial reach”).
239
240
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conditions”243 may nonetheless be reasonable, but this formulation
of the presumption against extraterritoriality as merely descriptive
risks confusing courts’ enforcement of a substantive policy against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law for empirical evidence of
Congress’s intent.244 In addition, the assumption that Congress
“primarily” legislates with respect to domestic matters provides
little guidance to courts assessing whether a statute also applies to
non-domestic, as well as domestic, matters or applies to a cause of
action with some domestic and some extraterritorial elements.
There are “many different ways to conceptualize domestic
concern”—including a concern for domestic conduct, for
extraterritorial conduct with domestic effects, and for extraterritorial
conduct by U.S. nationals—and “different conceptions might make
more sense for different types of legislation.”245
The presumption against extraterritoriality is also not a
constitutionally inspired clear statement rule despite the Supreme
Court’s occasional reference to separation of powers concerns to
justify the canon. Constitutionally inspired clear statement rules are
a subset of substantive canons that require Congress to state clearly
that a statute impinges on a “constitutionally inspired value.”246 The
Supreme Court has at times held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality preserves the constitutional separation of powers
because it prevents courts from making decisions with potential
foreign policy consequences, which the Constitution entrusts to the

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
See EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (ruling that the presumption
against extraterritoriality is “a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional
intent may be ascertained”); Kramer, supra note 12, at 184 (“[H]aving decided which
course of action is generally preferable, courts assume that this is what ‘reasonable’
lawmakers would want.”).
245
See Clopton, supra note 123, at 15.
246 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 399, 406-07 (2010). For example, courts have required Congress to “make its
intention . . . unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” where “Congress
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government.” Id. at 407-10 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
There is debate about whether constitutionally inspired clear statement rules are
compatible with textualism. See, e.g., id. at 403-05 (arguing that constitutionally
inspired clear statement rules “impose something of a clarity tax upon legislative
proceedings in particular areas” and impermissibly seek to enforce constitutional
values in the abstract); Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 111 (contending that “to the
extent a canon is constitutionally inspired, its application does not necessarily
conflict with the structural norms that constrain judges from engaging in broad,
equitable interpretation”).
243
244
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political branches and which they are better suited to make.247 In
Kiobel, for instance, the Supreme Court held that the presumption
“helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an
interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences
not clearly intended by the political branches.”248 The Court
explained that Congress alone “has the facilities necessary to make
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of
international discord are so evident and retaliative action so
certain.”249
The presumption against extraterritoriality nonetheless does not
qualify as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule for two
reasons. First, the separation of powers rationale applies in only a
fraction of the cases involving the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court often does not invoke the
constitutional rationale for the presumption.250 In addition, while a
separation of powers rationale might arguably support a strictly
territorial version of the canon, it is difficult to see how that rationale
applies to various other iterations of the presumption. For example,
the separation of powers rationale does not seem to support, and
instead weighs against, courts assessing whether the application of
U.S. law would result in “unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other nations,”251 as the Supreme Court did
247 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013); Sale
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (The “presumption has special
force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve
foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.”);
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22
(1963) (concluding that in the present “highly charged international
circumstances,” “there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed” “for us to sanction the exercise of local sovereignty . . . in this
delicate field of international relations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
248
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116.
249
Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)); see also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 258 (emphasizing “the need to make a clear
statement that a statute applies overseas” to prevent “unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord”).
250 See generally Clopton, supra note 123, at 16. The primary rationales for the
presumption against extraterritoriality over the past ten years instead seem to be
the “basic premise of our legal system that, in general, ‘United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world,’” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)), and Congress’s presumed focus on domestic concerns,
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (holding that the
territoriality presumption “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters”).
251
F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
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in Empagran. Likewise, balancing tests that require courts to weigh
the significance of factors connecting the “transaction regulated and
the national interest served by the assertion of authority”252 directly
involve courts in the type of foreign policy assessments that the
separation of powers rationale purportedly seeks to avoid.253 The
Morrison focus test also cannot be justified by reference to the
separation of powers because it requires courts to apply statutes to
extraterritorial conduct as long as the statute’s “focus” is domestic,
regardless of the potential for “foreign policy consequences not
clearly intended by the political branches.”254
Second, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not
qualify as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule because it
raises as many separation of powers concerns as it allays. A default
judgment against statutes’ application beyond U.S. borders is itself
a significant foreign policy judgment with potential consequences
for the United States’ foreign policy. In addition, the presumption
against extraterritoriality impinges on the separation of powers by
restricting Congress’s power to legislate under Article I of the
Constitution.255 That is especially true where courts set a high bar
for Congress to displace the presumption, as the Supreme Court has
done pursuant to the Morrison analysis, requiring that a statute
“manifest[] an unmistakable congressional intent to apply
extraterritorially”256 or a “clear” or “affirmative indication” to that
effect.257

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), the Court
rejected the notion that it should balance foreign and domestic contacts to
determine whether U.S. law applied to a foreign-flag ship. The Court refused to
apply U.S. law extraterritorially absent clearly expressed congressional intent to the
contrary, in part because the “purely ad hoc weighing of contacts” would
“inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs.” Id. at 19.
254
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116; see Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1045-46.
255 See generally Clopton, supra note 123, at 16-17. The presumption against
extraterritoriality, formulated as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule,
thus raises the same concerns as other clear statement rules: By requiring Congress
to formulate legislation more clearly than usual if it impedes a constitutionally
inspired value protected by a clear statement rule, courts “increase[] the expense of
enacting legislation” and “effectively impose[] a judicial tax upon legislation that
seeks to achieve a constitutionally disfavored result.” See Manning, supra note 246,
at 425.
256
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).
257
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
252
253
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2.3. Textualism and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Because the presumption against extraterritoriality is a
substantive canon, it is presumptively incompatible with textualism
unless it is used only to choose among equally plausible
interpretations of a statute.258 Insofar as the presumption against
extraterritoriality is applied to displace the most natural reading of
statutory text, it accords with textualism only if its application is so
longstanding and consistent that it forms part of the legal
background against which Congress legislates.
Courts’ variable and inconsistent application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality since its inception in the early nineteenth
century precludes it from forming part of the “closed set” of
substantive canons that comply with textualism. Specifically, U.S.
courts have interpreted the presumption to require strictly territorial
construction of statutes,259 to permit statutes to apply to
extraterritorial conduct when its effects are felt within U.S.
territory,260 to mandate a multi-factor conflict of laws analysis for
determining whether applying U.S. law would be reasonable,261 and
to permit the extraterritorial application of U.S. law where a statute’s
focus occurred in the United States.262 Similarly, U.S. courts have
justified the presumption with numerous competing, sometimes
inconsistent, rationales: The Supreme Court has at different times
asserted that Congress presumably intends for statutes not to violate
international law,263 and that Congress is assumed to legislate with
domestic concerns in mind.264 The Court has also held both that
separation of powers concerns justify applying the presumption to
prevent courts from engaging in foreign policy decision-making,265
and that the presumption requires courts to engage in multi-factor

See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
260 See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-24 (1927); United States v.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
261 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
262
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-70.
263
F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
264 Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
265
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013).
258
259
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balancing tests that inevitably involve foreign policy
considerations.266
There is accordingly no single presumption against
extraterritoriality that can form part of the “closed set” of
substantive canons that are compatible with textualism by virtue of
their longstanding and consistent application.267 None of the
numerous different doctrinal tests has been applied uniformly
enough to form part of the “shared background conventions” of
those who draft and interpret statutes.268 Judges seeking to comply
with textualism should therefore no longer apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality to displace the most natural reading of
statutory text.269 Specifically, textualist judges should assess a
statute’s extraterritorial reach by reference to ordinary textualist
tools of statutory interpretation. These include determining the
statute’s objectified intent, or “the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris,”270 and referring to applicable
linguistic canons and the “closed set” of longstanding substantive
canons.271 If a textualist judge can thereby determine a statute’s
extraterritorial reach—or the one most plausible interpretation of its
extraterritorial reach where there are several possible readings—
then he or she should not invoke the presumption against
extraterritoriality to reach a different result.
The two-step analysis that the Supreme Court announced in
Morrison in 2010 and has since developed in RJR Nabisco and
WesternGeco was originally formulated by Justice Scalia, among the
most committed proponents of textualism, but that analysis is
particularly problematic for textualists. The Court’s turn towards a
particularly strict presumption against extraterritoriality that
requires statutes to “manifest[] an unmistakable congressional
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 581-93.
Manning, supra note 4, at 2474.
268
Id. at 2467.
269
Dean Manning has also noted that insofar as longstanding substantive
canons are compatible with textualism because “the legislature presumably has
them in mind when it chooses its language,” “textualists should presumably
attempt to identify and apply the conventions in effect at the time of a statute’s
enactment.” Id. at 2474 n.318. This type of exercise would be patently absurd for
the presumption against extraterritoriality, given the number of doctrinal tests that
have been applied over the past two centuries and the courts’ unpredictable
selection among them.
270
Manning, supra note 5, at 16.
271
See supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
266
267
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intent to apply extraterritorially,”272 or a “clear” or “affirmative
indication” to that effect,273 is contrary to textualist tenets because it
displaces the most plausible reading of statutory text unless
In addition,
Congress legislates with heightened clarity.274
Morrison’s “focus” test is wholly new in several important
respects,275 and thus directly contradicts textualists’ insistence that
canons may displace the best interpretation of the statutory text only
where they have been applied so consistently as to form part of a
“closed set” of background conventions.276 The Morrison analysis
therefore also conflicts with textualists’ commitment to consistency
more generally,277 realizing warnings that a textualist judge who
develops the canons “common law style” “becomes just as
unpredictable as, and may even come to resemble, her
doppelganger the willful judge.”278
Even though none of the doctrinal tests applied pursuant to the
presumption against extraterritoriality form part of the “closed set”
of longstanding substantive canons, U.S. courts’ fairly consistent
resort to various iterations of the canon in order to limit statutes that
are worded universally and contain no explicit territorial restrictions
nonetheless gives rise to a legitimate, albeit more narrow,
background convention. The most straightforward interpretation of

RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
274 See Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 657 (“In place of a less-than-perfect
evidentiary showing about Congressional intentions, Morrison substitutes a purely
judicial construct, ‘focus,’ that makes no pretense at all of reflecting what Congress
wanted. So much for legislative supremacy.” (footnote omitted)); Gardner, supra
note 155, at 134 (“The presumption against extraterritoriality has become a means
for judges (particularly Justices) to override Congress in defining the proper scope
of litigation in U.S. courts.”).
275
See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
276
Manning, supra note 4, at 2474.
277
Scalia, supra note 220, at 588 (“Consistency is the very foundation of the
rule of law.”).
278
Eskridge, supra note 219, at 1545-46; see also Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84
MINN. L. REV. 199, 212 (1999) (“The creation of new canons and the manipulation of
old ones provide the formalist with a safety valve—a device for avoiding textual
readings that she cannot abide. When this proclivity to make law through canonical
technique is combined with the neat trick of selectively relying upon some
ambiguity to free the court to consider other factors, one must wonder whether the
new formalism is, in practice, very formalistic at all.”).
272
273
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statutes that refer to “any seaman,”279 “any court,”280 or “every
contract”281 seems to be that they apply universally, to every
seaman, court, and contract in the world. But the Supreme Court
has consistently interpreted those and other universally worded
statutes to apply only within the United States, or only in cases with
significant connections to the United States.282 A canon of statutory
interpretation providing that such universal language does not
speak to the issue of extraterritorial applicability and requires the
judicial imposition of some territorial limitations has thus been
applied consistently for a sufficient time to form part of the
background against which Congress legislates. Courts may read
territorial limitations into such statutes consistently with textualism,
but in formulating those limits textualism should be understood to
require that they adopt one test and apply it uniformly in order to
further the textualist tenet that statutes should be interpreted
predictably and consistently.283

279
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (quoting Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)).
280
Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)).
281
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (quoting Eight Hour Law,
Pub. L. No. 199, § 1, 37 Stat. 137, 137 (1912) (repealed 1962)).
282 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 576-77, 592-93 (ruling that the Jones Act did not apply
to a Danish sailor who had been hired by a Danish citizen to work aboard a Danish
ship while temporarily in the United States, and was allegedly injured while aboard
that ship in a Cuban harbor); Small, 544 U.S. at 394 (concluding “that the phrase
‘convicted in any court’ refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts”); Foley
Bros., 336 U.S. at 290-91 (ruling that “the Eight Hour Law is inapplicable to a
contract for the construction of public works in a foreign country over which the
United States has no direct legislative control”); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362, 370 (1824) (concluding that “general and comprehensive” provisions in U.S.
law “must always be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom
the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction”); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“Words having universal scope, such as ‘every contract
in restraint of trade,’ ‘every person who shall monopolize,’ etc., will be taken, as a
matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the
legislator subsequently may be able to catch.”).
283
Scalia, supra note 220, at 588 (“Consistency is the very foundation of the
rule of law. . . . [C]onsistency has a special role to play in judge-made law.”);
Manning, supra note 213, at 285 (Textualists “want clearly established background
rules of construction to guide legislators and interpreters in decoding textual
commands.”).
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3. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ORDINARY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND A CONSISTENT PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
FOR AMBIGUOUS AND UNIVERSALLY WORDED STATUTES
The extraterritorial reach of many statutes can be determined by
applying ordinary tools of textualist statutory interpretation,
including reading the text in context and with reference to linguistic
canons. Where such simple interpretation is sufficient, courts
seeking to comply with textualist tenets should no longer apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality to displace the most
plausible reading of statutory text. For statutes that are vague,
ambiguous, or universally worded, textualism should be
understood to favor adopting one consistent test rather than
affording courts discretion to decide extraterritoriality on a case by
case basis. Determining the precise contours of the canon is beyond
the scope of this Article, but the most plausible option appears to be
that adopted in the Supreme Court’s early decisions on the topic—
namely, construing statutes to comply with international law limits
on legislative jurisdiction.
3.1. Many Cases in Which the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Is Invoked Could and Should Be Resolved Using Ordinary
Statutory Interpretation
U.S. courts often invoke the presumption against
extraterritoriality where the geographic scope of a statute can be
discerned by reference to ordinary tools of textualist statutory
interpretation. In some such cases, courts cite the presumption in
order to displace the most plausible reading of the statutory text,
which, as discussed above, is contrary to textualist tenets. Judges
seeking to comply with textualism should no longer rely on the
presumption in those circumstances. In other cases, U.S. courts cite
the presumption against extraterritoriality only to bolster the most
plausible reading of statutory text. In those cases, the presumption
is superfluous because courts would reach the same result without
reference to the canon, but there is no real harm to invoking the
presumption from a textualist perspective. Neither scenario
requires the presumption against extraterritoriality to function as a
tiebreaker for ambiguous statutes or to supply a narrowing
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construction for universally worded statutory text; such cases are
addressed in Section B.
In Aramco, for instance, the Court relied on the presumption
against extraterritoriality to reach a result that was contrary to the
most plausible reading of the statute. The question presented was
whether the prohibitions on employment discrimination of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to a U.S. corporation’s
employment of Ali Boureslan, a U.S. citizen, in Saudi Arabia.284 Title
VII contained an “alien exemption provision,” which provided that
the statute “shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State.”285 The alien exemption
provision assumed that Title VII generally applies abroad by
excepting certain extraterritorial matters—the employment of aliens
outside the United States—from regulation.286 The alien exemption
provision thus made it relatively clear that Title VII applies to aliens
employed in the United States and U.S. citizens employed both
inside and outside the United States.
The Supreme Court nonetheless held that Title VII did not apply
to the extraterritorial employment of U.S. citizens by U.S.
corporations.
The Court applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality as a clear statement rule and thus searched for “the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,” rather than
for the best interpretation of the statutory text.287 The Court held
that the alien exemption provision did not meet that standard
because interpreting Title VII to apply to U.S. employers of U.S.
citizens abroad would extend the statute to foreign employers of U.S.
citizens abroad as well.288 The Court was “unwilling” to interpret
Title VII to apply to foreign employers of U.S. citizens abroad,
“which would raise difficult issues of international law,” absent
“clearer evidence of congressional intent to do so.”289

EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991).
Id. at 253 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)). The jurisdictional provisions of
Title VII were broad enough to encompass the case before the Supreme Court, as
they rendered Title VII applicable to employers “engaged in an industry affecting
commerce,” which was in turn defined to include “trade . . . between a State and
any place outside thereof.” Id. at 249 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g)).
286 Id. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287 Id. at 248, 258 (majority opinion).
288 Id. at 255 (“[W]e see no way of distinguishing in [the alien exemption
provision’s] application between United States employers and foreign
employers.”).
289 Id.
284
285
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The dissent in Aramco rightly concluded that the “available
indicia of Congress’ intent” established that Title VII applied
extraterritorially to Boureslan’s employment, and the majority had
used the presumption to displace “insufficiently strong”
congressional intent.290 In addition, adopting the most plausible
reading of the alien exemption provision and applying Title VII to
U.S. employers of U.S. citizens abroad would not automatically
extend the statute to foreign employers, as the Aramco majority
feared. The reference to “an employer” in Title VII may be limited
consistently with textualist tenets pursuant to the longstanding
background convention that universal statutory language is subject
to territorial limitation by the courts.291 Courts could, for instance,
construe the reference to “an employer” in Title VII consistently
with international law limits on legislative jurisdiction, likely
precluding the application of Title VII to foreign employers in most
cases.292
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court likewise relied on the presumption
against extraterritoriality to displace the most plausible
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.293 The ATS was enacted in
1789 and provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”294
The Court had previously in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain295 interpreted
the ATS to grant federal courts jurisdiction to recognize certain
Id. at 262, 266 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)(a).
292
As discussed above, courts seeking to comply with textualist tenets should
uniformly apply one doctrinal test to statutes that are ambiguous or universally
worded. See supra note 283 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 324-29 and
accompanying text. The contents of that new substantive canon are beyond the
scope of this Article, but the most plausible option appears to be construing statutes
to comply with international law limits on legislative jurisdiction.
293
The Court in Kiobel held that “[t]he principles underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality . . . constrain courts exercising their power under the
ATS.” 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013). For purposes of assessing whether U.S. courts rely
on the presumption to displace the most plausible reading of statutory text, it makes
no difference whether the Court’s ruling is framed as an extension of the
presumption against extraterritoriality to a jurisdictional statute or application of
the principles underlying it.
294
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
295
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
290
291
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causes of action under international law.296 The Court had
determined that the ATS was drafted to address a “narrow set of
violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and
at the same time threatening serious consequences in international
affairs,” namely “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”297 The Court had held that the
ATS therefore grants courts jurisdiction to recognize claims “based
on the present-day law of nations” only where they “rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the [three]
18th-century paradigms.”298
At issue in Kiobel was “under what circumstances courts may
recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.”299 The Supreme Court did
not seek to discern the best reading of the statute, but ruled that “to
rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince a clear
indication of extraterritoriality.”300 The Court concluded that
“nothing in the text of the statute suggests that Congress intended
causes of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach”
because violations of the law of nations “affecting aliens can occur
either within or outside the United States.”301 While it is true that
violations of aliens’ rights under international law can occur in U.S.
territory, the reference in the ATS to both aliens and international
law fairly clearly indicates that Congress was not primarily
concerned with wholly domestic matters.302
The better textualist reading of the ATS is instead that it permits
federal courts to recognize substantive causes of action under
international law in accordance with the international law
governing prescriptive jurisdiction.303 The ATS grants U.S. courts
jurisdiction to hear certain claims for violations “of the law of

Id. at 724.
Id. at 715.
298 Id. at 725.
299
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 112-13 (2013).
300 Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
301 Id.
302 Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (holding that
the presumption against extraterritoriality “rests on the perception that Congress
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters”).
303 See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 132 (Breyer, J., concurring).
296
297
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”304 The substantive
international law that federal courts may recognize pursuant to the
ATS is subject to no territorial limitation, but international law
restricts states’ exercise of legislative jurisdiction. The ATS’s grant
of jurisdiction to recognize as federal common law (and thus U.S.
domestic law) causes of action under international law should be
understood to incorporate those international law limits on states’
prescriptive jurisdiction as well. In the absence of any statutory
provision addressing the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, that
reading best approximates the statute’s objectified intent, or the
“intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the
law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”305
In addition, the historical context in which the ATS was enacted
indicates that its grant of jurisdiction is not limited to causes of
action that arise in or touch and concern U.S. territory, as the
Supreme Court held.306 Piracy was one of the three paradigmatic
18th-century offenses that the Sosa Court concluded “was probably
on minds of the men who drafted the ATS.”307 As Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion in Kiobel observed, piracy takes place not just on
the high seas beyond U.S. borders, but on ships, which are generally
considered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the country whose flag
they fly.308 This historical backdrop to the ATS leaves little doubt
that it was likely expected to apply beyond U.S. borders on ships
that may well be subject to the jurisdiction of another state. The
Kiobel majority sought to diminish the importance of the piracy
example on the basis that applying U.S. law to pirates on the high
seas had “less direct foreign policy consequences” because it
generally did not impose “the sovereign will of the United States
onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another
sovereign.”309 Even assuming that the foreign policy consequences
are lessened where U.S. law is applied in another state’s jurisdiction,
but not its territorial jurisdiction, the point still holds that the ATS
was fairly clearly intended to have some extraterritorial application.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Manning, supra note 5, at 16.
306
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25.
307 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
308 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 130 (Breyer, J., concurring); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 502 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
308 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 130 (Breyer, J., concurring).
309 Id. at 121 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
304
305
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In Smith, by contrast, the Supreme Court invoked the
presumption against extraterritoriality only to bolster its conclusion
that the FTCA did not apply to tortious acts or omissions by the
United States in Antarctica.310 The Court “turn[ed] first to the
language of” the FTCA’s foreign country exception, which provided
that “the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to
‘[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.’”311 The Court held that the
“commonsense meaning of the term” “country” included spaces
like Antarctica, with no recognized government.312 Acknowledging
that the foreign-country exception was susceptible to multiple
interpretations, the Court then turned to other provisions in the
FTCA to reinforce its conclusion that the FTCA does not apply in
Antarctica.313 Only then did the Court cite the presumption against
extraterritoriality, holding that it required “that any lingering doubt
regarding the reach of the FTCA be resolved against its
encompassing torts committed in Antarctica.”314 The presumption
was thus superfluous, and textualists could have resolved the case
in exactly the same way solely by reference to the text of the FTCA.
In sum, the geographic scope of many U.S. statutes can be
determined by reference to ordinary tools of textualist statutory
interpretation. In cases like Smith, courts cite the presumption only
to bolster the result they would have reached via ordinary statutory
interpretation.
The presumption against extraterritoriality is
superfluous in such cases, and there is no real harm or benefit from
a textualist perspective in citing the canon. In cases like Aramco and
Kiobel, by contrast, the presumption is used to displace the most
plausible interpretation of the statutory text, read in context and
against the remainder of the corpus juris.
Judges seeking to comply with textualist tenets should instead
adopt the most plausible reading of the text and should no longer
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality to change the
outcome in such cases. More specifically, textualist judges should
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-04 (1993); see supra note 99.
507 U.S. at 201 (quoting Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)).
312 Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1945)).
313 Id. at 201-03. For example, the Court determined that interpreting the
FTCA to apply in Antarctica would lead to a “bizarre result” because the statute
waives sovereign immunity only where tortious conduct would incur liability “in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” and
Antarctica has “no law.” Id. at 201-02 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)).
314 Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added).
310
311

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/1

2020]

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

597

seek to discern a statute’s extraterritorial reach by reference to
traditional textualist tools of statutory interpretation, including
focusing on the statute’s objectified intent along with permissible
canons of statutory interpretation. Where that analysis permits a
textualist judge to determine a statute’s extraterritorial reach—or the
most plausible interpretation of the statute’s extraterritorial reach—
the judge should not turn to the presumption against
extraterritoriality to reach a different result.
3.2. Textualism Should Require Adopting a Consistent Canon for
Determining the Extraterritorial Reach of Ambiguous and
Universally Worded Statutes
In some cases, statutes will prove indeterminate as to their
extraterritorial reach even after application of ordinary tools of
textualist statutory interpretation,315 including universally phrased
statutes that refer, for example, to “any seaman,”316 or “every
contract.”317 Textualism would permit a substantive canon to
resolve this statutory indeterminacy, but courts have varied the
presumption against extraterritoriality so significantly over the past
two centuries that there is no single test for courts to apply. In these
circumstances, textualism currently provides only that judges faced
with a statute that is indeterminate as to its geographic scope must
exercise discretion and resort to a measure of judicial lawmaking in
choosing which doctrinal test to apply. That conclusion is
unsatisfactory because it is contrary to the textualist principle that
the law should be applied consistently, enabling voters to hold
Congress accountable for its actions. Textualism should instead be
understood to require adopting a consistent approach for construing
the extraterritorial reach of statutes that are ambiguous or
universally worded.
315 See sources cited supra note 24; F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542
U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality
helps construe “ambiguous statutes”).
316
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1952) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)).
317
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (quoting Eight Hour Law,
Pub. L. No. 199, § 1, 37 Stat. 137, 137 (1912) (repealed 1962)). As discussed above,
there is a background convention that such universally phrased statutes are subject
to some territorial limitation and should not be read to apply worldwide. See supra
notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
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Textualists recognize that statutes inevitably contain ambiguity
and gaps, and that judges have substantial discretion in those cases.
Textualists contend that “no statute can be entirely precise, and that
the elaboration of statutory detail inevitably takes place outside the
formal confines of bicameralism and presentment.”318 They
conceive of statutory ambiguity as “essentially a delegation of
policymaking authority to the governmental actor charged with
interpreting a statute,” and believe that “it is no violation of the
obligation of faithful agency for a court to exercise the discretion that
Congress has given it.”319 Textualists therefore recognize that
“statutory indeterminacy . . . may at times involve judges in the
exercise of substantial policymaking discretion.”320
Textualism thus could appear to accord judges discretion to
construe statutes that are indeterminate as to their extraterritorial
reach by reference to any of the iterations of the presumption against
extraterritoriality or, potentially, their own policy preferences rather
than any of the iterations. To be sure, textualists acknowledge the
legitimacy of relying on substantive canons in exercising a court’s
discretion to resolve statutory indeterminacy,321 and would permit a
canon to resolve indeterminacy with respect to such a statute’s
geographic scope. Critically, however, no such canon currently
exists due to the inconsistent and variable application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality that has produced numerous
doctrinal tests without any coherent framework as to when which
test should apply.322 In these circumstances, textualism should be
understood to require the development of a consistent canon of
statutory interpretation for determining the extraterritorial reach of
ambiguous and universally worded statutes.
The Supreme Court has recognized the need for such
consistency. In Morrison, RJR Nabisco, and WesternGeco, the Court
sought to formulate an iteration of the presumption against
extraterritoriality that could be applied consistently and predictably
and that would thus respond to these criticisms. Importantly,
318
Manning, supra note 10, at 699 (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted); see also id. (“All general legal texts require exposition when applied to
particular fact situations.”).
319
Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 123.
320 See Manning, supra note 10, at 701; see also SCALIA, supra note 5, at 35
(“Whatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the executive
or (ultimately) the judicial branch.”).
321 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 123.
322
See supra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.
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however, while the Court has twice affirmed the Morrison analysis
over the past decade, significant questions remain about when the
Morrison analysis applies, what it requires, and whether it can be
administered coherently. It remains at best unclear whether the
newest iteration of the presumption against extraterritoriality will
or should apply in the long term.323
It is important to textualist principles that a consistent
formulation of the presumption be adopted. A consistently applied
canon for statutes that are indeterminate as to their extraterritorial
reach would further textualist tenets in several ways. First, adopting
a uniform rule would further the textualist principle that “the law
must be consistent,”324 and would give fair notice of the conduct a
statute regulates.325 (Consistent and predictable application of the
law is, of course, a fundamental principle that is embraced by all
schools of statutory interpretation,326 and it should weigh in favor of
a uniform approach to extraterritoriality for each of them). Second,
a consistent test would serve “[t]extualism’s simple ambition . . . to
require legislators to accept responsibility for their legislative
acts.”327 Regardless whether legislators actually take the canons into
account in drafting statutes,328 a clear rule about how the text will be
See supra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
Scalia, supra note 220, at 588; Frickey, supra note 278, at 207-08 (“If the new
formalism has not resulted in greater predictability and certainty, however, it has
failed on its own terms.”); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
74, 127-28 (2000) (“Justice Scalia . . . has said about the canons of construction that
‘[w]hat is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive rules,’ which suggests that any clearly established
canonical default rule is better than judicial vacillation between the possible rules.”
(quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989))).
325
In addition to providing notice of the law, a consistently applied canon
would also save public and private resources by encouraging settlements and
reducing litigation to determine whether a law applies extraterritorially.
326
See Scalia, supra note 220, at 588 (“Consistency is the very foundation of the
rule of law. . . . [Y]ou will search long and hard to find anyone, in any age, who
would reject the fundamental principle underlying the equal protection clause: that
persons similarly situated should be similarly treated—that is to say, the principle
that the law must be consistent.”); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the
Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1420 (2005) (“Consistency has the potential, after
all, to reap efficiency gains both for the drafters of legislation (who may predict how
their creation will be interpreted . . .) as well as those actors who must adapt their
behavior based upon a prediction of how the court will interpret certain statutory
law . . . .”).
327
Manning, supra note 10, at 738.
328
See Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 224, at 945-47 (showing that
congressional counsel involved in drafting statutes were generally not familiar with
many of the substantive canons).
323
324
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construed permits voters to hold Congress accountable for the
predictable outcomes of legislation.329 Finally, developing one
consistent doctrinal test rather than permitting courts to pick among
the doctrinal tests applied in the past and their own policy
preferences best accords with courts’ consistent recognition that a
test is required in order to address ambiguity on extraterritoriality,
even if courts have thus far been unable to settle on one.
There are a variety of potential ways of determining U.S.
statutes’ geographic scope, but each approach is subject to criticism.
Whether and to what extent U.S. law should be read to apply
extraterritorially absent clear congressional instructions is a
complex and difficult policy question and, as experience
demonstrates, there are no easy answers. That said, the most
plausible approach appears to be a presumption that Congress
intends to legislate up to the limits imposed by U.S. conceptions of
public and private international law,330 at least with respect to civil
law.331 Relying on public international law to construe ambiguous
329
Cf. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J.
INT’L L. 351, 388 (2010) (“Only canons capable of predictable application enable
courts to produce the interpretive backdrop that allows Congress, the executive,
and others affected by federal statutes to understand how they are likely (albeit not
certain) to be applied.”).
330
Numerous commentators have argued in favor of an approach that takes
into account international law on prescriptive jurisdiction. E.g., Born, supra note 21,
at 82 (“[C]ourts could presume that Congress has extended federal law to the limits
prescribed by the principles of international law currently prevailing in the United
States.”); Knox, supra note 329, at 353 (arguing in favor of a “renewed presumption
against extrajurisdictionality,” the strength of which “would depend on the
international law of legislative jurisdiction”); O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1087-88
(arguing that for civil cases “it makes sense to revert to the Court’s historical
practice of (1) determining, with reference to normal canons of statutory
interpretation, the appropriate geographical scope of a statute in light of the
statute’s policy objectives and (2) applying the Charming Betsy canon as a means of
determining whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute would offend
international law”). U.S. conceptions of public international law on prescriptive
jurisdiction and private international law conflict of laws principles are currently
the subject of much discussion and debate. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 405-413 (AM. LAW. INST. 2018);
Donald Earl Childress III, International Conflict of Laws and the New Conflicts
Restatement, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 361 (2017). Defining the exact contours that
a new international law presumption would take in light of these ongoing
developments is beyond the scope of this Article.
331
Some scholars have cogently argued that criminal law should be subject to
a separate, stricter presumption against extraterritoriality based on “foundational
separation of power and legality principles that are central in criminal adjudication
but that are not applicable in civil cases.” O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1089; cf.
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statutes avoids international strife by ensuring that the exercise of
U.S. legislative jurisdiction abroad is viewed as legitimate by the
international community.332 Furthermore, construing U.S. law to
comply with conflict of laws principles that require courts to balance
the interests of different states with connections to a dispute would
minimize conflicts with other states’ laws while ensuring that U.S.
law is likely to apply where the United States has substantial
regulatory interests.333 In addition, U.S. courts have long applied
public and private international law principles in order to interpret
federal statutes’ extraterritorial reach.334 While courts have not
applied those principles uniformly, choosing an approach with a
strong historical foundation is more consistent with textualists’
embrace of longstanding background conventions than a novel or
infrequently applied test would be.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the tests that courts might adopt to construe
ambiguous or universally worded statutes, but courts should not
follow the two-part analysis set forth in Morrison and RJR Nabisco or
turn to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As
discussed above, the Morrison analysis is difficult to administer
consistently and predictably for at least two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has defined the “focus” of a statute so broadly as to
provide no real guidance to lower courts, holding only that the
“object of the statute’s solicitude . . . can turn on the conduct, parties,
Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 393-98 (2019)
(“The better judicial approach should continue to balance foreign affairs and
criminal interests, but do so in a manner that is tilted away from foreign affairs
deference and towards criminal legal reasoning.”). Employing different analyses
for federal criminal and civil law does not contradict this Article’s suggestion that
courts should pick one test and apply it uniformly. As Professors Julie Rose
O’Sullivan and Steven Arrigg Koh explain, additional considerations apply to
federal criminal law, and uniformly applying two separate analyses to federal
criminal and civil law achieves the same consistency and predictability this Article
recommends.
332
Knox, supra note 329, at 382 (“If a U.S. law extends beyond the boundaries
set by international law, it will almost unavoidably cause conflicts with other
countries, conflicts in which the United States will be widely perceived as being in
the wrong.”).
333 See generally Born, supra note 21, at 82-90.
334 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571 (1953); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is
firmly established in our jurisprudence.”); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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or interests that it regulates or protects.”335 Second, the Court has
not provided clear instruction as to which statutory provisions must
separately pass muster under the presumption against
extraterritoriality in order for U.S. law to apply abroad.336 In RJR
Nabisco, the Court held that the presumption applies regardless
whether the statute “regulates conduct [or] affords relief”337 and
applied the presumption separately to RICO’s private cause of
action and liability provisions,338 while in WesternGeco it refused to
decide whether the presumption applies separately to “general
damages remed[ies].”339 And even though the Court has held that
the Morrison analysis applies where “the statute in question . . .
merely confers jurisdiction,”340 commentators have rightly doubted
that the Court will apply the canon separately to jurisdictional
provisions like the federal question statute.341
A more fundamental problem with the Morrison analysis is that
there is no reason to think that a statute’s “focus” has any relation to
Congress’s intent as to whether the statute should apply to a cause
of action with extraterritorial elements.342 Nor does the “focus” test
require courts to engage with the issues that gave rise to the
presumption against extraterritoriality, including conflicts of law,
friction with foreign nations, international law, and the feasibility of
extending U.S. law abroad.343 Courts assessing a statute’s “focus”
335
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2138 (2018)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
336
See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
337
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
338
Id. at 2101-11.
339
138 S. Ct. at 2136-37. Similarly, RJR Nabisco assessed the focus of RICO’s
private right of action (the plaintiff’s injury) independently from the focus of the
provisions imposing liability, while WesternGeco looked to the Patent Act’s
provisions on substantive liability to determine the focus of the damages remedy.
Supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
340
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
341
See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
342
Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 657 (“Morrison substitutes a purely judicial
construct, ‘focus,’ that makes no pretense at all of reflecting what Congress
wanted.”).
343
Parrish, supra note 176, at 1674 (“Instead of wrestling with the difficult
questions of whether Congress intended a law to apply to foreign conduct and, if
so, whether doing so is constitutional or consistent with international law, some
courts have sidestepped the issue of legislative jurisdiction entirely” by “redefining
extraterritoriality itself.”); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953)
(holding that maritime law “has attempted to avoid or resolve conflicts between
competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the
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interpret the statute and may pay close attention to the statutory text
and structure, but there is no obvious relation between this
assessment and whether a statute should apply in a given case as a
matter of congressional intent or policy.344 Assessing a statute’s
focus in order to determine whether U.S. law applies thus realizes
warnings about “textualism’s greatest risk: converting the Court’s
role to answering a clever puzzle.”345
The “focus” analysis thus leaves courts ill-equipped to assess the
difficult questions presented by many complex, transnational
cases.346 For example, in In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail
transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws are involved,”
and that “in dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we
forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law
to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction”).
344
One might argue that even though the “focus” test does not require
assessment of conflicts of law, international law, or friction with foreign nations, it
will still on balance lead to sensible results from a policy perspective. That
argument is difficult to assess (or to credit) because the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance on how to discern a statute’s “focus.” In addition, the
“focus” analysis has the potential to generate conflicts of law or friction with foreign
nations where it deems application of U.S. law to be domestic and thus permissible
because the “focus” occurred in the United States even though significant aspects
of the cause of action arose abroad. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and
Limitations of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 62, 66
(2016) (noting the potential for “jurisdictional conflict” where “application of U.S.
law to foreign conduct” is permissible under the Morrison analysis). Conversely,
the “focus” test may treat application of U.S. law as extraterritorial (and thus
impermissible unless the presumption is rebutted) even where substantial parts of
a cause of action occurred in the United States as long as the “focus” occurred
abroad, and thereby potentially undermine U.S. regulatory interests.
345
Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation:
Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2074 (2017)
(citing Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994)); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—
In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816-17 (1983) (“By
making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative, the canons
conceal, often from the reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the
writer, the extent to which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting
a statute . . . .”); Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 665 (contending that the “change in
terminology” implemented in Morrison “moves the process further away from
statutory interpretation”).
346
See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50
(2019) (“When a [modern financial] transaction takes place either in multiple places
or electronically, fixating on the location of that transaction is bound to result in
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. At worst, it creates loopholes for private actors
to opt out of mandatory laws of the United States that are in part designed to
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Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”),347
Microsoft sought to quash a warrant issued under the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) requiring Microsoft to import data
stored in Ireland for delivery to federal authorities in the United
States. The Second Circuit ultimately concluded that the focus of the
SCA was “on the privacy of stored communications,”348 so that
executing the warrant “would constitute an unlawful extraterritorial
Whether, absent congressional
application of the Act.”349
instruction, U.S. law should be construed to permit federal
authorities to command a U.S. company to produce data held
extraterritorially is a hard question, especially considering the
difficulty localizing the data in a meaningful way.350 Rather than
providing for courts to consider and address the issues that make
the question difficult—such as the potentially conflicting interests of
the United States and Ireland and whether international law would
permit such a warrant—Morrison requires courts to solve “a clever
puzzle” and discern a statutory focus that has no bearing on whether
a statute should apply as a matter of congressional intent or
policy.351
In adopting the two-step Morrison analysis, the Supreme Court
sought to establish a clear rule for resolving cases with
extraterritorial elements, in line with “formalist themes of
safeguard the general public’s interest at large.”); Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1044
(In Morrison, “the Court essentially returned the law to the old vested rights theory
in choice of law, in which an entire multijurisdictional claim was ‘localized’ based
on a single element. . . . But the idea that localizing a multijurisdictional claim to
one jurisdiction and then applying that jurisdiction’s laws to all elements of the
claim somehow does not implicate extraterritoriality is to engage in a legal
fiction.”); Simowitz, supra note 177, at 389 (“[T]he focus test has divided and
perplexed the courts.”).
347
829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated as moot and remanded sub nom. United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
348 Id. at 217.
349 Id. at 220. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but before the case was
heard Congress enacted legislation overturning the Second Circuit’s ruling and
providing that a service provider must disclose data in its “possession, custody, or
control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is
located within or outside of the United States.” Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of
Data Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2713; see generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct.
1186 (2018) (per curiam).
350 See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 373, 407-08 (2014).
351 See Simowitz, supra note 177, at 403 (arguing with respect to the Second
Circuit’s decision in Microsoft that it is not clear “why the larger question of which
sovereign’s law should apply should turn on server location”).
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predictability and judicial restraint.”352 The Supreme Court itself
explained in Morrison that “the wisdom of the presumption against
extraterritoriality” was to supply “a stable background against
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects” “[r]ather than
guess anew in each case.”353 But the mechanical test set forth in
Morrison—like any mechanical test—is ill-suited to resolving the
difficult questions raised by complex transnational cases.354 While
“textualists may in practice have a predilection for rules,”355 the rule
set forth in Morrison does not further textualist ends of consistency
and predictability.
Courts may also be tempted to turn to the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment for the contents of a new presumption against
extraterritoriality. Over the past thirty years, federal appellate
courts have increasingly interpreted the Due Process Clause to limit
the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law.356 With respect to
criminal legislation, federal appellate courts generally focus on
whether application of the law to the defendant would be arbitrary
352
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1044; Buxbaum, supra note 344, at 62 (referring
to “the Court’s continuing quest to identify categorical, territory-based rules
governing the application of U.S. statutes in cases involving significant foreign
elements”).
353 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
354
See Buxbaum, supra note 344, at 62 (arguing that “like other recent
decisions, RJR raises doubt as to the sufficiency of such [categorical, territory-based]
rules to address the messy and often unpredictable patterns of transnational
economic activity”); Moon, supra note 346, at 52 (arguing that an “‘aggregate
contacts’ test allows courts to progressively develop case law that adapts to new
forms of cross-border commercial transactions that will continue to challenge
territorially defined laws”); Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, Technology, and
National Security, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 45 (2016) (“On issues of technology and
national security, territorial rules seem particularly ill suited: territorial rules aspire
to certainty, but technology makes it harder to define ‘territoriality’ in a consistent
and predictable way; technology weakens territoriality as a proxy for policy goals
because data often move in ways disconnected with the interests of users and
lawmakers; and technology makes it easier for public or private actors to
circumvent territorial rules . . . .”).
355
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 424.
356 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 121, 159-65 (2007). No circuit to consider the issue has rejected the
applicability of the Due Process Clause, but the D.C. Circuit has deferred ruling on
the issue. In re Sealed Case, 936 F.3d 582, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (concluding that
the “ultimate question under the Due Process Clause . . . is whether application of
the statute to the defendant would be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair,” but
withholding judgment on “whether the Due Process Clause constrains the
extraterritorial application of federal criminal laws at all” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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or fundamentally unfair,357 but courts sometimes disagree on what
that test entails.358 The law is much less developed in the civil
context, but a few circuits have indicated that the Due Process
Clause would impose limits here too.359 The Supreme Court has not
357 United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2016); United States
v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d
547, 552-54 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Murillo, 826 F.3d 152, 157 (4th Cir.
2016); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1999); United States
v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 393 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916,
918-19 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 371-73 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Baston, 818
F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016); cf. In re Sealed Case, 936 F.3d at 593-94.
358 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1323-35 (2014) (arguing that “courts have spawned multiple
tests for evaluating whether exercises of U.S. extraterritorial prescriptive
jurisdiction satisfy due process”). For instance, courts disagree whether and when
the Due Process Clause requires a nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct
and the United States for crimes committed by foreigners aboard foreign vessels
where the flag nation consents to the application of U.S. law. Compare United States
v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that consent of the foreign
state to the application of U.S. law aboard a vessel flying the foreign state’s flag
“does not eliminate the nexus requirement” that the Due Process Clause imposes),
with Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 403 (holding that no nexus is required where the
criminalized conduct “is condemned universally by law-abiding nations,” and that
“consent from the flag nation eliminates a concern that the application of the
[federal drug trafficking law] may be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair”), and
Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (“[D]ue process does not require the government to prove
a nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct and the United States in a
prosecution under [a drug trafficking law] when the flag nation has consented to
the application of United States law to the defendants.”). Courts also have different
conceptions of the role of international law in the due process analysis. See Cardales,
168 F.3d at 553 (“In determining whether due process is satisfied, we are guided by
principles of international law.”); Baston, 818 F.3d at 669 (holding that
“[c]ompliance with international law satisfies due process because it puts a
defendant on notice that he could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United
States” (internal quotation marks omitted), but “is not necessary to satisfy due
process”); Rojas, 812 F.3d at 392-93 (treating international law and the Due Process
Clause as two distinct hurdles to extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law);
Caicedo, 47 F.3d at 372 (“Principles of international law are useful as a rough guide
in determining whether application of the statute would violate due process.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
359 See Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Congress’s power to impose civil penalties for
fraud in predominately foreign securities transactions is limited only by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) S.A.L., 730
F.2d 1103, 1107 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing in dicta that certain extraterritorial
federal legislation “could be challenged as violating the due process clause”);
DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Obviously . . . the due
process clause of the fifth amendment places bounds upon congressional efforts to
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yet determined whether the Due Process Clause restricts Congress’s
constitutional authority to legislate extraterritorially.360
As courts develop a uniform presumption against
extraterritoriality, they should not simply presume that federal law
extends up to any bounds set by the Due Process Clause.361 Any
restrictions imposed on U.S. law by the Due Process Clause are
constitutional outer bounds that do not necessarily indicate to what
extent U.S. law should apply within those outer limits as a matter of
likely congressional intent or of policy. Additionally, federal courts’
disagreement over the requirements imposed by the Due Process
Clause with respect to criminal legislation along with the lack of
cases refining any such requirements for civil legislation pose a
practical impediment to this approach. Courts developing a
uniform presumption against extraterritoriality may nonetheless
find it useful to draw on the analyses of international law on
prescriptive jurisdiction362 and fairness to defendants363 that have
been developed in the due process context. The critical point for
present purposes is not the precise content of the substantive canon
of statutory interpretation for determining the geographic scope of
ambiguous statutes, but that textualism should be understood to
favor adopting a consistent approach in these circumstances.

apply American rules of decision to transactions in which the United States has no
sufficient interest. In this respect, in the international arena, fifth amendment due
process serves the same purpose as does fourteenth amendment due process with
respect to the states.”).
360
Stigall, supra note 20, at 347.
361
Whether courts have correctly interpreted the Due Process Clause to limit
the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law is beyond the scope of this Article and
has been the subject of scholarly debate. Compare Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi,
Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217,
1223 (1992) (“It is our thesis that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits
federal actions in much the same manner that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause limits state actions.”), with A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on
Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 427 (1997)
(arguing that “the Fifth Amendment does not operate to limit Congress in this
way”), and Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 323, 338-41 (warning that “it may be logically awkward for a defendant to rely
on what could be characterized as an extraterritorial application of the U.S.
Constitution in an effort to block the extraterritorial application of U.S. law”).
362 See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding that international law permits all states to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction aboard stateless vessels).
363 See, e.g., United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2008).
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4. CONCLUSION
The presumption against extraterritoriality is incompatible with
textualism insofar as it is used to displace the most plausible reading
of the statutory text because courts have not applied the canon
consistently enough for it to become part of the closed set of
background conventions. Rather, courts have applied a multitude
of different, inconsistent iterations of the presumption, invoking an
equally diverse set of rationales. Ironically, the Morrison analysis
that the Supreme Court has developed over the past decade, in part
to address these difficulties, presents particular problems for
textualism because it is wholly new and it supplants insufficiently
clear congressional instructions that a statute applies
extraterritorially. Judges seeking to comply with textualist tenets
should therefore resolve statutes by reference to the best reading of
the statutory text in context wherever possible, and they should not
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality to reach a
contrary result.
Courts’ consistent reliance on a presumption against
extraterritoriality in one form or another nonetheless gives rise to a
background convention that statutes with universal language,
referring to “any contract” or “any seaman,” are not meant to apply
throughout the world. Textualists can construe such universally
worded statutes to have some territorial limits consistently with
textualism. Critically, however, textualism should be understood to
require, but has not yet produced, a consistent approach for
resolving the extraterritorial reach of such universally worded
statutes and of statutes that are otherwise ambiguous as to their
geographic scope. A canon assuming that Congress legislates up to
the limits set by private and public international law is the most
likely contender.
That conclusion points to a broader insight about textualism.
Just as textualism would otherwise provide no meaningful guidance
on interpreting statutes that are ambiguous as to their geographic
scope, textualism generally does not aid courts in construing truly
ambiguous statutes, beyond conceding that they entail some judicial
discretion or lawmaking.
For these statutes, textualism is
incomplete and leaves judges to reach varying conclusions based on
their own discretion.
In some circumstances, textualism can be augmented with new
substantive canons to resolve these issues. Where, as for statutes
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that are ambiguous as to their extraterritorial reach, numerous
statutes over time present the same or similar recurring questions of
statutory interpretation, textualism should provide for the adoption
of a new, consistently-applied substantive canon.364 In those cases,
the judicial discretion inherent in ambiguous statutes can and
should be harnessed to require judges to decide similar cases
uniformly over time according to a substantive canon. Judges
thereby grant litigants enhanced notice of the law, provide Congress
with a stable background rule against which to legislate, and thus
hold Congress accountable for its legislation.

364 See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, A Defense of Substantive Canons of Construction,
2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 942 (“The most obvious benefit to the legal system of judges
developing rules of interpretation to resolve hard cases is that the articulation and
implementation of these rules will increase predictability and coherence of the
law.”); Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 124 (Canons that implement
extraconstitutional values “are a useful way of specifying the social values that
should influence judges in resolving statutory ambiguity.”).
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